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  purpose	  of	  the	  present	  correlational,	  ex	  post	  facto	  study	  was	  to	  evaluate	  the	  predictive	  ability	  and	  academic	  achievement	  criterion	  outcomes	  of	  two	  district-­‐developed	  interim	  mathematics	  assessment	  programs	  for	  a	  sample	  of	  5,801	  grade	  6	  students	  in	  a	  large	  urban	  school	  district.	  	  Average	  scores	  for	  both	  interim	  assessment	  types	  were	  statistically	  significantly	  more	  related	  to	  2013	  FCAT	  2.0	  scores	  (r	  =	  .75	  and	  .72;	  p	  <	  .001)	  than	  all	  other	  predictors	  (i.e.,	  student	  demographics,	  Florida	  school	  grade,	  and	  student	  course	  GPA)	  except	  for	  2012	  FCAT	  2.0	  scores	  (r	  =	  .78;	  p	  <	  .001).	  	  Further,	  the	  newer	  interim	  assessment	  program	  with	  an	  instructional	  purpose	  and	  curriculum-­‐based	  sequencing	  had	  slightly	  stronger	  overall	  predictive	  power	  (rs	  =	  .88)	  and	  a	  higher	  criterion	  mean	  score	  (M	  =	  218.08)	  than	  the	  older,	  state-­‐test	  mirror	  interim	  assessment	  program	  (rs	  =	  .85;	  M	  =	  215.47).	  	  Regression	  models	  by	  prior	  year	  FCAT	  2.0	  Achievement	  Level	  yielded	  some	  predictor	  ranking	  discrepancies	  by	  prior	  achievement	  level.	  	  Although	  not	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level,	  groups	  of	  students	  with	  a	  more	  moderate	  total	  number	  of	  interim	  assessments	  outperformed	  groups	  with	  all	  or	  nothing.	  	  
Overall,	  the	  two	  types	  of	  interim	  assessment	  programs	  evaluated	  in	  the	  present	  study	  were	  good	  predictors	  of	  the	  state	  high-­‐stakes	  test,	  2012	  Grade	  6	  Mathematics	  FCAT	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2.0.	  	  However,	  more	  research	  must	  be	  done	  to	  identify	  with	  certainty	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  act	  of	  taking	  the	  interim	  tests	  and	  receiving	  feedback	  contributes	  to	  improved	  student	  learning.	  	  
	   	   	  
	  
CHAPTER	  1	  
Introduction	  Since	  the	  1840s,	  students	  in	  the	  United	  States	  have	  been	  exposed	  to	  high-­‐stakes	  educational	  assessment.	  	  Over	  the	  years	  and	  more	  recently	  with	  No	  Child	  Left	  Behind	  (NCLB)	  and	  Race	  to	  the	  Top	  (RTTT),	  the	  federal	  government	  has	  expanded	  its	  role	  in	  overseeing	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  based	  on	  these	  educational	  assessments.	  	  Within	  the	  realm	  of	  educational	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  and	  achievement-­‐focused	  public	  schooling,	  interim	  assessments	  are	  nestled	  between	  the	  popularized	  formative	  assessments,	  with	  their	  lofty	  promises	  of	  instructional	  gains	  yet	  elusive	  definition,	  and	  stalwart	  summative	  assessments,	  omnipresent	  and	  routinely	  criticized.	  	  Unlike	  both	  formative	  and	  summative	  assessments,	  interim	  assessments	  may	  well	  be	  the	  “Goldilocks”	  of	  educational	  assessment.	  
Purpose	  of	  the	  Study	  
The	  purpose	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  to	  examine	  the	  outcomes	  of	  interim	  assessments	  and	  to	  help	  address	  the	  questions,	  “Do	  these	  interim	  assessments	  work	  the	  way	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  work?”	  and	  “Do	  they	  work	  better	  than	  what	  we	  already	  have?”	  	  Simply	  checking	  for	  alignment	  between	  purpose	  and	  results	  is	  insufficient	  for	  a	  full	  evaluation	  of	  interim	  assessments.	  	  Scriven,	  the	  scholar	  who	  first	  developed	  the	  current	  usage	  for	  the	  terms	  formative	  and	  summative	  evaluation	  (1967),	  emphasized	  that	  evaluation	  studies	  must	  examine	  side	  effects,	  consider	  cost	  effectiveness,	  and	  identify	  “critical	  competitors”	  (Scriven,	  1974,	  p.	  25).	  	  Researchers	  and	  evaluators	  must	  attempt	  to	  find	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alternative	  means	  that	  might	  accomplish	  the	  same	  or	  better	  ends	  at	  lower	  cost	  or	  with	  fewer	  negative	  side	  effects.	  	  For	  example,	  teacher-­‐assigned	  grades,	  prior	  year	  test	  scores,	  and/or	  demographics	  might	  serve	  as	  alternatives	  to	  interim	  assessments.	  	  	  
The	  present	  study	  examined	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐year	  summative	  achievement	  outcomes	  of	  students	  who	  took	  either	  of	  two	  distinctly	  different	  types	  of	  interim	  assessment.	  	  The	  study	  compared	  the	  utility	  from	  a	  district-­‐level	  perspective	  of	  a	  common	  form	  of	  interim	  assessment—the	  predictive	  whole-­‐year	  summative	  version—with	  another,	  less	  common	  and	  more	  involved	  form	  of	  interim	  assessment—the	  instructional	  curriculum	  unit-­‐based	  interim	  assessment.	  	  The	  study	  investigated	  whether	  these	  two	  types	  of	  interim	  assessments	  are	  valuable	  for	  predictive	  purposes	  above	  and	  beyond	  data	  widely	  available	  after	  NCLB,	  such	  as	  student	  demographics,	  prior	  year	  scores,	  and	  teacher-­‐assigned	  grades.	  	  	  
Significance	  of	  the	  Study	  
The	  introduction	  of	  NCLB	  reporting	  requirements	  and	  subsequent	  consequences	  increased	  the	  sense	  of	  urgency	  among	  educators	  and	  policymakers	  to	  capture	  measures	  of	  performance	  prior	  to	  high-­‐stakes	  testing	  dates.	  	  Research	  literature	  about	  formative	  assessment	  is	  quite	  common	  and	  detailed	  (Wiliam	  &	  Black,	  1998a,	  1998b);	  however,	  the	  literature	  relating	  to	  interim	  or	  benchmark	  testing	  is	  both	  sparse	  and	  inconclusive	  (Goertz	  ,	  Olah,	  &	  Riggan,	  2010;	  Henderson,	  Petrosino,	  Guckenburg,	  &	  Hamilton,	  2008;	  Perie,	  Marion,	  &	  Gong,	  2009;	  Shepard,	  2010).	  	  Even	  so,	  evaluative	  and	  predictive	  data	  sought	  by	  educators	  and	  policymakers	  are	  usually	  not	  a	  product	  of	  the	  formative	  assessment	  process	  (Li,	  Marion,	  Perie,	  &	  Gong,	  2010;	  Popham,	  2008).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  local	  and	  national	  policymakers	  are	  leaning	  toward	  including	  interim	  assessments	  in	  required	  assessment	  systems.	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Although	  not	  high-­‐stakes,	  interim	  assessments	  are	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  next	  generation	  assessment	  systems.	  	  Interim	  assessment	  is	  uniquely	  situated	  between	  low-­‐stakes	  classroom	  formative	  assessment	  and	  high-­‐stakes	  external	  summative	  assessment.	  	  In	  the	  state	  of	  Florida,	  school	  districts	  are	  required	  by	  law	  to	  administer	  local	  assessments	  of	  some	  form	  to	  provide	  data	  on	  remedial	  student	  progress	  toward	  the	  state	  standardized	  tests	  (Fla.	  Stat.	  Ann.	  §	  1008.25	  (4)(a),	  2013)	  and	  low-­‐performing	  school	  improvement	  (Fla.	  Stat.	  Ann.	  §	  1008.35	  (1)(a),	  2013).	  	  Many	  school	  districts,	  such	  as	  the	  district	  of	  focus	  in	  the	  present	  study,	  administer	  assessments	  to	  all	  students	  in	  all	  schools	  in	  lieu	  of	  simply	  satisfying	  these	  state	  requirements	  for	  remedial	  or	  low-­‐performing	  students	  and	  schools.	  
Educators	  are	  spending	  more	  instructional	  time	  administering	  additional	  district-­‐level	  tests	  and	  less	  time	  instructing	  students.	  	  The	  instructional	  time	  lost	  represents	  what	  economists	  would	  call	  an	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  test	  administration,	  meaning	  that	  educators	  must	  pay	  for	  testing	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  missed	  opportunity	  to	  teach.	  	  As	  this	  shift	  occurs,	  questions	  about	  whether	  interim	  assessments	  are	  valuable	  to	  educators,	  and	  if	  so,	  which	  kinds	  are	  more	  valuable,	  are	  key	  to	  evaluating	  policies	  and	  improving	  instructional	  practice	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  
Theoretical	  Framework	  	  The	  three	  main	  types	  of	  assessment	  described	  by	  Perie,	  Marion,	  and	  Gong	  (2009)	  are	  summative,	  with	  a	  large	  scope	  and	  minimal	  frequency;	  formative,	  with	  a	  narrow	  scope	  and	  high	  frequency;	  and	  interim	  between	  the	  two,	  with	  a	  moderate	  scope	  and	  frequency.	  	  Each	  has	  a	  place	  within	  a	  K-­‐12	  district	  comprehensive	  assessment	  system.	  	  Although	  summative	  testing	  has	  been	  studied	  in	  the	  U.S.	  since	  the	  early	  19th	  century,	  Wiliam	  and	  Black	  (1998a,	  1998b)	  brought	  a	  positive	  light	  to	  ongoing,	  classroom	  formative	  assessment	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in	  the	  late	  20th	  century.	  	  Interim	  assessment	  is	  newer	  still,	  and	  yet	  has	  been	  increasingly	  utilized	  for	  predictive,	  instructional,	  and	  evaluative	  purposes.	  If	  educators	  are	  to	  forgo	  instructional	  time	  to	  administer	  interim	  assessments,	  the	  tests	  ought	  to	  have	  the	  most	  utility	  possible.	  	  One	  such	  characteristic	  of	  utility	  is	  the	  predictive	  ability	  of	  interim	  assessments	  versus	  other,	  less	  intrusive	  and	  time-­‐consuming	  predictors	  such	  as	  teacher-­‐assigned	  grades	  or	  demographics	  (Perie,	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Another	  characteristic	  of	  utility	  is	  academic	  impact	  or	  instructional	  value.	  	  	  The	  present	  study	  utilized	  Perie	  et	  al.	  (2009)’s	  framework	  for	  considering	  interim	  assessment	  programs.	  	  Included	  in	  their	  framework	  are	  evaluative	  criteria	  by	  which	  to	  consider	  different	  interim	  assessment	  systems,	  depending	  on	  which	  intended	  purpose	  the	  systems	  espouse.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  first	  criterion	  for	  predictive	  interim	  assessments	  was	  used	  to	  help	  answer	  whether	  the	  tests	  provide	  predictive	  utility:	  The	  assessment	  should	  be	  highly	  correlated	  with	  the	  criterion	  measure	  (e.g.,	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	  state	  assessment).	  	  The	  technical	  documentation	  should	  include	  evidence	  of	  the	  predictive	  link	  between	  the	  interim	  assessment	  and	  the	  criterion	  measure.	  	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  additional	  testing	  and	  cost,	  the	  predictive	  assessment	  should	  be	  significantly	  more	  related	  to	  the	  criterion	  measure	  than	  other	  measures	  (e.g.,	  teachers’	  grades)	  that	  could	  be	  used.	  (Perie	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  p.	  10)	  Perhaps	  another	  way	  to	  think	  about	  this	  is	  that	  data	  collected	  from	  a	  predictive	  interim	  test	  should	  have	  sufficient	  criterion	  related	  validity	  to	  justify	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  administration.	  	  This	  thought	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  a	  more	  general	  sense	  for	  all	  student	  assessments	  in	  the	  Student	  Evaluation	  Standards,	  developed	  by	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  Standards	  for	  Educational	  Evaluation	  in	  2001.	  	  The	  standard	  that	  applies	  here	  is	  standard	  A1	  Validity	  Orientation,	  which	  recommends	  that	  student	  evaluations	  allow	  for	  valid	  interpretations	  (JCSEE,	  2001).	  	  
	   	   	  
	  
5	  
	  In	  addition	  to	  predictive	  utility,	  instructional	  utility	  was	  evaluated	  using	  Perie	  et	  al.’s	  (2009)	  second	  criterion	  for	  instructional	  interim	  assessments:	  Ideally,	  the	  system	  should	  provide	  evidence,	  based	  on	  scientifically	  rigorous	  studies,	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  assessment	  system	  has	  contributed	  to	  improved	  student	  learning	  in	  settings	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  which	  it	  will	  be	  used.	  (p.	  10)	  JCSEE’s	  first	  standard	  in	  the	  Student	  Evaluation	  Standards,	  P1	  Service	  to	  Students,	  addresses	  the	  concept	  of	  improving	  student	  learning	  in	  a	  broader	  sense:	  that	  student	  evaluations	  should	  “promote	  sound	  principles,	  fulfillment	  of	  institutional	  missions,	  and	  effective	  student	  work,	  so	  that	  the	  educational	  needs	  of	  students	  are	  served.”	  	  One	  method	  for	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  educational	  needs	  of	  students	  have	  been	  served,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  learning	  has	  occurred,	  is	  to	  use	  an	  existing	  summative	  test	  aligned	  to	  the	  subject	  taught.	  	  All	  of	  these	  aspects	  of	  student	  assessment	  in	  general,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  interim	  assessments	  in	  particular,	  take	  place	  within	  the	  context	  of	  local	  and	  national	  policy	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  	  Policy	  at	  the	  federal,	  state,	  and	  district	  levels	  greatly	  influences	  how	  and	  what	  assessment	  programs	  are	  implemented	  at	  the	  school	  level.	  	  




Figure	  1.	  	  Theoretical	  framework	  for	  the	  present	  study.	  	  Adapted	  with	  permission	  from	  “A	  framework	  for	  considering	  interim	  assessments”	  by	  M.	  Perie,	  S.	  Marion,	  and	  B.	  Gong,	  2007.	  	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.nciea.org.	  
Research	  Questions	  	  
The	  first	  two	  research	  questions	  in	  the	  present	  study	  were	  directed	  at	  predictive	  utility,	  and	  the	  last	  addressed	  instructional	  utility,	  of	  two	  simultaneous	  interim	  assessment	  programs	  implemented	  in	  a	  large,	  urban	  school	  district	  in	  Northeast	  Florida.	  	  The	  following	  
Local	  Accountability	  and	  Assessment	  Policy 
	  
Summative 
Interim	   (Perie	  et	  al.,	  2009) 
Classroom	  Formative	  Assessment (Wiliam	  &	  Black,	  1998a,	  1998b) 
	  	  
Federal	  Accountability	  and	  Assessment	  Policy 
Frequency 
Scope 	  Predictive 
	  Instructional 	  Evaluative 
A1	  Validity	  Orientation	   P1	  Service	  to	  Students	   (JCSEE,	  2001) 
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questions	  provided	  a	  framework	  for	  study	  design,	  analysis	  and	  discussion	  in	  the	  present	  study:	  
1. To	  what	  extent	  can	  variance	  in	  middle	  school	  student	  scores	  on	  mathematics	  high-­‐stakes	  state	  tests	  be	  explained	  by	  scores	  on	  district	  interim	  assessments	  after	  controlling	  for	  prior	  scores,	  student	  demographic	  variables,	  and	  teacher-­‐assigned	  grades?	  2. To	  what	  extent	  can	  variance	  in	  middle	  school	  student	  scores	  within	  achievement	  levels	  on	  mathematics	  high-­‐stakes	  state	  tests	  be	  explained	  by	  scores	  on	  district	  interim	  assessments	  after	  controlling	  for	  prior	  scores,	  student	  demographic	  variables,	  and	  teacher-­‐assigned	  grades?	  3. To	  what	  degree	  does	  achievement,	  as	  measured	  by	  mathematics	  high-­‐stakes	  state	  tests,	  of	  middle	  school	  students	  who	  have	  experienced	  less	  frequently	  administered,	  predictive	  interim	  assessments	  differ	  from	  the	  achievement	  of	  students	  who	  have	  experienced	  more	  frequently	  administered,	  instructional	  assessments,	  after	  controlling	  for	  prior	  scores?	  	  
Key	  Terms	  and	  Definitions	  
The	  following	  section	  presents	  definitions	  of	  terms	  germane	  to	  the	  present	  study.	  
Assessment	  or	  test	  –	  Assessment	  is	  “a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  means	  for	  eliciting	  evidence	  of	  student	  performance”	  (National	  Research	  Council,	  2001)	  or	  a	  “process	  of	  gathering	  information	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  judgments	  about	  a	  current	  state	  of	  affairs”	  (Pellegrino,	  2002,	  p.	  48).	  	  Assessments	  must	  necessarily	  include	  cognition,	  observations,	  and	  interpretation	  (Pellegrino,	  2002).	  	  Although	  some	  consider	  tests	  a	  rigid	  subset	  of	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assessments,	  the	  terms	  test	  and	  assessment	  are	  used	  interchangeably	  throughout	  the	  present	  study,	  unless	  specifically	  differentiated	  in	  some	  way.	  
Interim	  Assessment	  -­‐	  Interim	  assessment	  means	  “an	  assessment	  that	  is	  given	  at	  regular	  and	  specified	  intervals	  throughout	  the	  school	  year,	  is	  designed	  to	  evaluate	  students’	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  relative	  to	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  academic	  standards,	  and	  produces	  results	  that	  can	  be	  aggregated	  (e.g.,	  by	  course,	  grade	  level,	  school,	  or	  [Local	  Educational	  Agency]	  LEA)	  in	  order	  to	  inform	  teachers	  and	  administrators	  at	  the	  student,	  classroom,	  school,	  and	  LEA	  levels”	  (U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education,	  2009,	  p.	  15).	  	  Interim	  assessments	  are	  not	  high-­‐stakes	  external	  assessments,	  nor	  are	  they	  low-­‐stakes	  classroom	  assessments—they	  fall	  between	  these	  types.	  	  One	  key	  difference	  between	  interim	  assessments	  and	  formative	  assessments	  is	  that	  interim	  scores	  may	  be	  aggregated	  across	  teachers	  and	  schools,	  whereas	  formative	  scores	  tend	  to	  be	  unique	  to	  the	  teacher.	  
Some	  argue	  that	  when	  thinking	  about	  K-­‐12	  education	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  graduation	  as	  the	  ultimate	  outcome,	  any	  assessment	  following	  the	  first	  test	  given	  in	  Kindergarten	  is	  an	  
interim	  assessment.	  	  However,	  the	  present	  study	  adheres	  to	  the	  definition	  provided	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education	  above,	  which	  would	  exclude	  most	  state	  testing	  programs	  because	  they	  are	  not	  given	  at	  regular	  and	  specified	  intervals,	  and	  excludes	  informal	  and	  classroom	  tests	  because	  the	  results	  cannot	  necessarily	  be	  aggregated	  across	  grade	  levels,	  schools,	  or	  school	  districts.	  
Formative	  Assessment	  -­‐	  “Assessments	  that	  pair	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  student	  and	  teacher	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  individual	  learning	  progression	  are	  said	  to	  be	  formative	  in	  nature”	  (Lile,	  2012).	  	  Formative	  assessment	  is	  more	  informal	  than	  other	  types	  of	  assessment,	  and	  involves	  evaluation	  of	  student	  understanding	  while	  the	  student	  is	  still	  learning—prior	  to	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the	  end	  of	  the	  instructional	  unit	  or	  course.	  	  Interim	  assessments	  are	  not	  initially	  formative	  because	  they	  are	  typically	  developed	  external	  to	  the	  classroom	  and	  are	  more	  formal.	  	  However,	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  and	  security	  level	  of	  interim	  assessment,	  teachers	  may	  formatively	  use	  the	  data	  gathered	  by	  an	  interim	  assessment,	  and	  possibly	  the	  test	  itself	  ex	  post	  facto,	  to	  discuss	  details	  with	  students	  and	  develop	  an	  individual	  learning	  progression.	  
Summative	  Assessment	  -­‐	  An	  assessment	  is	  summative	  if	  the	  main	  purpose	  is	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  student	  learned	  over	  the	  course	  of	  an	  instructional	  unit	  or	  year.	  	  Summative	  assessments	  are	  usually	  formal	  and	  are	  not	  intended	  for	  granular	  feedback	  purposes	  (e.g.,	  evidence	  for	  mastery	  of	  specific	  skill	  areas).	  	  These	  tests	  typically	  are	  secure,	  meaning	  that	  students	  do	  not	  know	  the	  content	  of	  the	  test	  prior	  to	  administration,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  high-­‐stakes	  state	  tests,	  even	  school	  district	  faculty	  and	  staff	  are	  prohibited	  from	  viewing	  the	  contents.	  
Utility	  –	  In	  a	  general	  sense,	  utility	  or	  usefulness	  of	  assessment	  is	  defined	  by	  Herman	  and	  Baker	  (2009)	  as	  follows:	  
Utility	  represents	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  intended	  users	  find	  the	  test	  results	  meaningful	  and	  are	  able	  to	  use	  them	  to	  improve	  teaching	  and	  learning.	  Benchmark	  tests	  with	  high	  utility	  provide	  information	  that	  administrators,	  teachers,	  and	  students	  can	  use	  to	  monitor	  student	  progress	  and	  take	  appropriate	  action.	  (p.	  53)	  
The	  present	  study	  focused	  mainly	  on	  specific	  aspects	  of	  usefulness	  from	  the	  school	  district	  administrator	  perspective,	  namely	  predictive	  ability	  and	  end-­‐results	  of	  achievement.	  	  Other	  perspectives	  are	  equally	  as	  important	  but	  were	  not	  addressed	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  For	  example,	  the	  Student	  Evaluation	  Standards	  contain	  seven	  utility	  standards,	  including	  information	  scope,	  evaluator	  qualifications,	  and	  effective	  reporting	  (JCSEE,	  2001).	  	  These	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aspects	  are	  requirements	  for	  an	  overall	  useful	  student	  evaluation.	  	  However,	  for	  purposes	  of	  brevity	  in	  the	  present	  study,	  the	  word	  utility	  represented	  the	  usefulness	  in	  terms	  of	  administrators’	  use	  for	  prediction	  and	  final	  evaluation	  of	  instructional	  outcomes	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  state	  standardized	  test.	  
Educational	  Accountability	  -­‐	  Within	  the	  realm	  of	  educational	  policy,	  “educational	  accountability”	  focuses	  upon	  transparency	  and	  the	  obligation	  to	  report	  assessment	  results	  to	  external	  evaluators	  and	  the	  public	  in	  an	  accurate	  manner.	  	  Accountability	  arose	  from	  external	  concerns	  about	  the	  efficacy	  of	  public	  school	  systems	  and	  specific	  actors	  within	  the	  system.	  	  Accountability	  systems	  are	  characterized	  by	  “increased	  real	  or	  perceived	  stakes	  of	  results	  for	  teachers	  and	  educational	  administrators”	  (Linn,	  2000,	  p.	  7).	  
High-­‐stakes	  Testing	  -­‐	  “High-­‐stakes	  testing	  is	  the	  process	  of	  attaching	  significant	  consequences	  to	  a	  standardized	  test	  performance	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  incentivizing	  teacher	  effectiveness	  and	  student	  achievement”	  (Nichols,	  Glass,	  &	  Berliner,	  2010,	  p.	  3)	  or,	  conversely,	  exercising	  sanctions	  for	  lack	  of	  effectiveness	  or	  achievement.	  
Benchmark	  (standards)	  -­‐	  Benchmarks,	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  present	  study,	  are	  operationalized	  as	  learning	  targets	  set	  by	  the	  Florida	  Department	  of	  Education	  (FDOE).	  	  Benchmarks	  are	  sub-­‐components	  of	  Big	  Ideas	  or	  Supporting	  Ideas	  as	  delineated	  in	  the	  2007	  Mathematics	  Next	  Generation	  Sunshine	  State	  Standards	  for	  K-­‐8.	  	  Each	  grade	  level	  in	  Florida	  has	  its	  own	  set	  of	  Big	  Ideas	  and	  Supporting	  Ideas,	  and	  each	  of	  these	  includes	  more	  granular	  benchmarks.	  	  M/J	  Math	  1,	  the	  traditional	  sixth-­‐grade	  mathematics	  course,	  includes	  3	  Big	  Ideas,	  3	  Supporting	  Ideas,	  and	  19	  benchmarks.	  	  For	  example,	  Big	  Idea	  1	  is	  “Develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  and	  fluency	  with	  multiplication	  and	  division	  of	  fractions	  and	  decimals,”	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whereas	  one	  of	  the	  benchmarks	  under	  this	  Big	  Idea	  is	  “Explain	  and	  justify	  procedures	  for	  multiplying	  and	  dividing	  fractions	  and	  decimals”	  (FDOE,	  2007).	  	  
Learning	  Schedule	  –	  The	  school	  district	  published	  a	  Learning	  Schedule	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  courses	  offered	  in	  the	  district	  during	  the	  2012-­‐2013	  school	  year.	  	  Each	  Mathematics	  Learning	  Schedule	  included	  learning	  targets,	  assessment	  exemplars,	  a	  pacing	  guide	  for	  the	  district	  curriculum,	  and	  supplemental	  resource	  lists.	  	  Learning	  Schedules	  were	  developed	  by	  school-­‐based	  educators	  and	  reviewed	  by	  district-­‐level	  content	  specialists.	  	  
Module	  –	  For	  the	  2012-­‐2013	  school	  year,	  a	  module	  was	  an	  instructional	  unit	  in	  any	  Mathematics	  course’s	  Learning	  Schedule.	  	  The	  Mathematics	  Learning	  Schedule	  authors	  wanted	  to	  use	  a	  term	  that	  would	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  a	  textbook	  unit,	  freeing	  the	  Learning	  Schedule	  authors	  to	  veer	  away	  from	  the	  sequence	  in	  the	  adopted	  textbooks	  and	  instead	  use	  the	  state’s	  benchmarks	  to	  guide	  sequencing.	  
Urban	  –	  The	  present	  study	  utilizes	  the	  United	  States	  Census	  Bureau’s	  definition	  of	  urban	  as	  “densely	  developed	  residential,	  commercial	  and	  other	  nonresidential	  areas”	  and	  as	  having	  50,000	  or	  more	  people	  in	  one	  area	  (U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  2012).	  	  The	  school	  district	  of	  focus	  includes	  over	  1	  million	  residents,	  qualifying	  the	  school	  district	  as	  urban.	  
Organization	  of	  the	  Study	  	  	  
The	  present	  study	  is	  organized	  into	  five	  chapters.	  	  This	  first	  chapter	  has	  introduced	  the	  study,	  including	  context,	  research	  questions,	  significance,	  definition	  of	  key	  terms,	  and	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  study.	  	  Chapter	  2	  begins	  with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  historical	  literature	  leading	  up	  to	  and	  including	  current	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policy	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  literature	  relative	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  accountability	  policy	  as	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well	  as	  the	  application	  of	  the	  policy	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  	  The	  literature	  review	  also	  includes	  a	  basic	  assessment	  review	  of	  types	  of	  district-­‐based	  interim	  assessments	  and	  a	  discussion	  regarding	  the	  differences	  between	  formative	  assessments	  and	  interim	  assessments.	  	  Together,	  these	  studies	  provided	  a	  conceptual	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  useful	  for	  the	  later	  analysis	  of	  data,	  discussion	  of	  findings,	  and	  conclusions.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  Chapter	  3	  is	  to	  describe	  the	  design	  and	  methods	  of	  the	  study,	  including	  a	  description	  of	  the	  two	  interim	  assessment	  programs,	  the	  context	  surrounding	  the	  particular	  types	  of	  assessments	  used	  as	  data	  sources,	  sample	  selection	  criteria,	  study	  design,	  and	  the	  procedures	  used	  to	  collect	  and	  analyze	  data.	  	  Study	  delimitations	  and	  limitations	  are	  also	  included	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  Chapter	  4	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study,	  and	  Chapter	  5	  includes	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  major	  findings,	  implications	  of	  the	  study,	  and	  policy	  and	  future	  research	  recommendations.	  
	   	  






	  This	  chapter	  is	  an	  overview	  of	  literature	  regarding	  four	  main	  research	  areas	  relating	  to	  district-­‐created	  interim	  assessments:	  1. Evolution	  of	  Standardization,	  Accountability,	  and	  Testing	  Policy	  in	  the	  U.S.	  2. Effects	  of	  High-­‐Stakes	  Testing	  Accountability	  Policies	  	  3. Recent	  Test-­‐Based	  Accountability	  in	  Florida	  	  4. District-­‐Developed	  Interim	  Assessments	  	  Each	  section	  in	  the	  chapter	  corresponds	  to	  one	  of	  these	  four	  research	  areas.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  with	  a	  broad	  historical	  perspective	  and	  ends	  with	  topics	  more	  particular	  to	  the	  present	  study,	  including	  major	  purposes	  for	  district-­‐level	  interim	  assessments.	  	  A	  conceptual	  framework	  follows	  the	  literature	  review.	  
Evolution	  of	  Standardization,	  Accountability,	  and	  Testing	  Policy	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  
A	  common	  misperception	  is	  that	  high-­‐stakes	  testing	  is	  a	  new	  phenomenon.	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  original	  high-­‐stakes	  test	  and	  standards-­‐based	  instruction	  took	  place	  well	  before	  the	  No	  Child	  Left	  Behind	  Act	  and	  A	  Nation	  at	  Risk.	  	  Education-­‐related	  accountability	  testing	  in	  the	  United	  States	  began	  during	  the	  1840s	  in	  the	  same	  city	  that	  boasts	  the	  nation’s	  first	  and	  oldest	  existing	  public	  school,	  Boston	  Latin	  School,	  and	  the	  nation’s	  first	  high	  school,	  English	  High	  School	  (Kress,	  Zechmann,	  &	  Schmitten,	  2011;	  Spring,	  2005).	  	  Boston’s	  first	  test	  to	  monitor	  their	  schools’	  effectiveness	  was	  very	  similar	  in	  purpose	  to	  what	  we	  now	  consider	  high-­‐stakes	  tests	  in	  that	  it	  was	  used	  to	  support	  comparisons	  across	  classrooms	  and	  schools.	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Just	  as	  high-­‐stakes	  testing	  is	  not	  new,	  neither	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  educational	  standards.	  	  The	  first	  official	  standards	  began	  with	  a	  group	  of	  college	  presidents	  and	  professors	  who	  gathered	  in	  the	  early	  1890s	  as	  the	  National	  Education	  Association’s	  Committee	  of	  Ten	  on	  Secondary	  School	  Studies	  (Goertz,	  2007,	  p.	  4;	  Spring,	  2005).	  	  The	  National	  Education	  Association,	  which	  is	  now	  the	  nation’s	  largest	  teachers’	  union	  (Spring,	  2011),	  and	  its	  Committee	  of	  Ten	  recommended	  a	  standardized	  curriculum	  for	  all	  high	  school	  students,	  including	  preparation	  for	  college	  or	  career,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  knowledge	  of	  the	  curriculum	  should	  be	  assessed.	  	  At	  the	  time,	  though,	  high	  schools	  only	  enrolled	  10%	  of	  14-­‐	  to	  17-­‐year-­‐olds,	  thus	  limiting	  the	  reach	  of	  these	  standards	  (Goertz,	  2007;	  Kress	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Spring,	  2005).	  
Varied	  curriculum,	  standardized	  tests	  for	  tracking.	  	  Once	  students	  from	  working	  class	  and	  immigrant	  families	  began	  reaching	  high	  school	  in	  larger	  proportions,	  the	  National	  Education	  Association	  convened	  a	  Commission	  on	  the	  Reorganization	  of	  Secondary	  Education	  (CSRE)	  in	  1918.	  	  The	  CSRE	  recommended	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  common	  curriculum	  previously	  in	  place	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  Their	  report,	  Cardinal	  Principles	  of	  
Secondary	  Education,	  called	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  high	  school	  with	  a	  differentiated	  curriculum	  including	  vocational	  courses	  (Spring,	  2005).	  	  	  	  
Just	  as	  curriculum	  was	  becoming	  less	  standardized,	  educational	  testing	  was	  becoming	  more	  standardized	  by	  virtue	  of	  business	  and	  military	  influence.	  Frederick	  Winslow	  Taylor’s	  concept	  of	  scientific	  management	  became	  popular	  among	  businesspeople	  around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  Taylor	  described	  efficient	  factory	  production	  that	  relied	  upon	  the	  managers’	  ability	  to	  study	  and	  gather	  a	  massive	  amount	  of	  data	  about	  the	  work,	  hire	  the	  best	  workers,	  provide	  incentives	  to	  do	  what	  was	  considered	  best	  practice,	  and	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divide	  the	  work	  appropriately	  (Taylor,	  1916).	  	  Soon	  after,	  John	  Franklin	  Bobbitt	  applied	  Taylor’s	  scientific	  management	  concept	  to	  educational	  management	  (Au,	  2011).	  	  
The	  military	  also	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  influence	  on	  the	  standardization	  of	  testing.	  	  In	  1917,	  psychologists	  published	  the	  Army	  Alpha	  assessment	  to	  sort	  World	  War	  I	  recruits	  by	  their	  perceived	  ability,	  and	  popularized	  the	  idea	  that	  these	  multiple-­‐choice	  standardized	  intelligence	  tests	  were	  superior	  to	  subjective,	  less	  scientific,	  constructed-­‐response	  tests	  often	  seen	  in	  classrooms	  (Ravitch,	  2010;	  Resnick,	  1985).	  	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  educators	  began	  to	  sort	  students	  by	  their	  perceived	  ability	  by	  using	  the	  first	  series	  of	  standardized	  achievement	  tests,	  the	  Stanford	  Achievement	  Tests	  (Hamilton,	  2003).	  	  Educators	  valued	  the	  efficiency	  and	  objectivity	  of	  machine-­‐graded	  tests	  as	  student	  enrollment	  continued	  to	  increase	  and	  diversify;	  by	  1930,	  approximately	  70%	  of	  14-­‐	  to	  17-­‐year-­‐olds	  were	  enrolled	  in	  high	  schools	  across	  the	  country	  (Kress	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Ravitch,	  2010;	  Spring,	  2005).	  
Educational	  policymakers	  began	  to	  view	  the	  practice	  of	  implementing	  test	  policy	  as	  a	  favorable	  way	  to	  reform	  education	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  Tests	  are	  relatively	  inexpensive	  (Linn,	  2000;	  Ravitch,	  2010),	  easily	  and	  quickly	  put	  into	  action	  or	  altered	  (Jennings,	  2012;	  Linn,	  2000),	  and	  produce	  visible	  results	  that	  will	  most	  likely	  demonstrate	  an	  increase	  within	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  implementation	  (Linn,	  2000).	  	  Testing	  as	  a	  policy	  became	  even	  more	  popular	  following	  the	  1947	  speech	  by	  scientist	  and	  academic	  James	  B.	  Conant,	  who	  conceptualized	  an	  educational	  system	  which	  singled	  out	  and	  supported	  students	  with	  greater	  intellectual	  capacity	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  country’s	  scientific	  community	  and	  military	  forces	  (Spring,	  2005).	  	  The	  newly	  developed	  and	  highly	  controversial	  Selective	  Service	  College	  Qualification	  Test	  allowed	  college-­‐bound	  men	  to	  choose	  whether	  to	  serve	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  or	  go	  to	  college.	  	  Tests	  during	  this	  time	  were	  seen	  as	  tools	  for	  student	  selection	  and	  tracking	  (Linn,	  2000).	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After	  the	  war,	  however,	  public	  schools	  began	  to	  demand	  more	  funds	  and	  space	  as	  they	  tried	  to	  accommodate	  the	  Baby	  Boom	  generation	  and	  students	  from	  a	  wider	  variation	  in	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  backgrounds	  following	  the	  historic	  1954	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  ruling	  and	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  (Ravitch,	  2010;	  Spring,	  2005;	  Gong,	  2012).	  	  Warnings	  from	  academics	  and	  military	  critics	  that	  education	  had	  become	  anti-­‐intellectual	  coincided	  with	  the	  Russian	  launch	  of	  the	  Sputnik	  I	  satellite.	  	  Responding	  to	  public	  outcries,	  Congress	  passed	  the	  National	  Defense	  Education	  Act	  (NDEA)	  in	  1958.	  	  In	  a	  speech	  promoting	  NDEA,	  President	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower	  called	  for	  a	  nationwide	  testing	  system	  to	  select,	  and	  incentives	  to	  persuade,	  students	  with	  high	  ability	  to	  seek	  scientific	  or	  professional	  career	  paths	  (Goertz,	  2007;	  Spring,	  2005).	  	  As	  part	  of	  NDEA,	  federal	  money	  was	  tied	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  specific	  educational	  programs	  and	  curricular	  materials	  relating	  to	  math,	  science,	  and	  foreign	  languages.	  	  Few	  districts	  could	  refuse	  the	  much-­‐needed	  money,	  increasing	  federal	  aid	  for	  and	  therefore	  intervention	  into	  education	  (Spring,	  2011).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Title	  I	  and	  federal	  aid.	  	  Separate	  federal	  or	  “categorical”	  aid	  began	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  1965	  Elementary	  and	  Secondary	  Education	  Act	  (ESEA)	  as	  part	  of	  Presidents	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  and	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson’s	  War	  on	  Poverty	  (Jennings,	  2012;	  Spring,	  2005,	  2011).	  	  Title	  I	  of	  ESEA	  specified	  that	  federal	  funds	  would	  be	  made	  available	  to	  schools	  servicing	  children	  from	  low-­‐income	  families	  as	  long	  as	  they	  met	  the	  national	  policy	  objectives	  (Mills,	  2008;	  Spring,	  2005,	  2011).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  federal	  involvement	  in	  ongoing	  operations	  of	  local	  education	  for	  the	  first	  time	  (Kress	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  ESEA	  resulted	  in	  the	  first	  two	  formal	  national	  educational	  testing	  programs.	  	  Planning	  for	  the	  National	  Assessment	  of	  Educational	  Progress	  (NAEP)	  began	  in	  1964	  with	  a	  grant	  from	  the	  Carnegie	  Corporation,	  and	  the	  first	  national	  assessments	  were	  implemented	  in	  1969	  (National	  Center	  for	  Education	  Statistics	  [NCES],	  2012).	  	  Some	  viewed	  the	  creation	  of	  NAEP	  and	  enactment	  of	  the	  Title	  I	  legislation	  as	  the	  “precursor	  to	  today’s	  widespread	  use	  of	  tests	  as	  tools	  for	  holding	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educators	  accountable	  for	  student	  performance”	  (Hamilton,	  2003,	  p.	  27).	  	  The	  Title	  I	  Evaluation	  and	  Reporting	  System	  (TIERS)	  also	  linked	  the	  ESEA	  to	  commercial	  standardized	  tests	  for	  accountability	  purposes	  (Linn,	  2000).	  	  	  	  
As	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  ruling	  of	  1954	  and	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  prompted	  wide-­‐scale	  desegregation	  of	  schools	  across	  the	  country,	  testing	  for	  accountability	  and	  tracking	  continued	  to	  increase.	  	  New	  York	  was	  the	  first	  state	  to	  implement	  state-­‐developed	  testing	  in	  1965	  (Ravitch,	  2010).	  	  Florida	  began	  its	  state-­‐developed	  testing	  program	  in	  1971	  (Herrington	  &	  MacDonald,	  2000).	  
Equity-­‐based	  policy	  continued	  into	  the	  1970s	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Individuals	  with	  Disabilities	  Education	  Act	  (IDEA)	  of	  1975;	  the	  Educational	  Amendments	  of	  1972,	  in	  particular	  Title	  IX,	  which	  forbids	  gender	  discrimination	  in	  education	  or	  extracurricular	  programs;	  and	  the	  Lau	  remedies	  of	  1974,	  which	  guaranteed	  children	  an	  opportunity	  to	  a	  meaningful	  education	  regardless	  of	  their	  language	  background	  (Jennings,	  2012).	  	  As	  more	  students	  began	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  education	  and	  federal	  and	  state	  fiscal	  support	  increased,	  concerns	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  educational	  quality	  began	  to	  rise	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  In	  September	  1975,	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  published	  a	  story	  stating	  that	  SAT	  scores	  had	  fallen	  for	  over	  a	  decade,	  prompting	  many	  policymakers	  to	  revisit	  educational	  policy	  (Ravitch,	  2010).	  
Test-­‐based	  accountability.	  	  Around	  this	  time,	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policies	  became	  much	  more	  popular	  among	  state	  departments	  of	  education	  and	  were	  targeted	  to	  hold	  educators	  accountable	  for	  the	  operation	  and	  performance	  of	  their	  schools	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  Tests	  designed	  to	  assess	  whether	  students	  had	  met	  minimum	  standards,	  “minimum	  competency	  tests,”	  became	  widespread	  in	  the	  1970s	  as	  well	  (Hamilton,	  2003;	  Kress	  et	  al.,	  2011);	  the	  number	  of	  states	  requiring	  minimum	  competency	  tests	  increased	  from	  2	  states	  
	   	   	  
	  
18	  
in	  1973	  to	  34	  states	  in	  1983	  (Linn,	  2000).	  	  Teachers	  felt	  pressure	  to	  help	  their	  students	  achieve	  a	  passing	  score,	  and	  some	  purposely	  focused	  preparation	  on	  the	  specific	  test	  competencies	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  	  
The	  U.S.	  federal	  government	  expanded	  its	  role	  through	  equity-­‐based	  policies	  and	  categorical	  aid	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  	  However,	  in	  1979,	  the	  educational	  role	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  increased	  dramatically	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education	  and	  corresponding	  cabinet	  position	  of	  Secretary	  of	  Education	  by	  President	  Jimmy	  Carter	  (Spring,	  2011).	  	  Although	  minimum	  competency	  tests	  were	  becoming	  ubiquitous	  and	  purportedly	  raising	  the	  number	  of	  students	  mastering	  basic	  skills,	  some	  argued	  a	  lack	  of	  emphasis	  on	  higher-­‐order	  skills	  (e.g.,	  critical	  thinking)	  within	  the	  school	  curriculum	  and	  pointed	  to	  international	  comparisons	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  reform	  yet	  again	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  	  
Upon	  request	  of	  the	  newly	  formed	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education,	  A	  Nation	  at	  Risk	  was	  published	  in	  1983	  (National	  Commission	  on	  Excellence	  in	  Education	  [NCEE],	  1983).	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  “national	  security,”	  A	  Nation	  at	  Risk	  called	  for	  a	  change	  in	  national	  educational	  policy	  focus	  from	  basic	  competency	  to	  a	  commitment	  to	  excellence	  (Goertz,	  2007;	  Kress	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  NCEE,	  1983).	  	  The	  report	  cited	  numerous	  dismal	  national	  and	  international	  standardized	  test	  score	  comparisons	  and	  related	  facts,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  intended	  to	  shock	  the	  country	  out	  of	  mediocrity.	  	  Among	  the	  recommendations	  for	  developing	  what	  was	  called	  a	  “Learning	  Society,”	  the	  report	  called	  for	  several	  input-­‐related	  reforms:	  a	  set	  of	  common	  standards,	  more	  rigorous	  course	  offerings	  and	  progression,	  increased	  expectations	  of	  homework	  and	  effort,	  an	  expanded	  school	  day	  and	  school	  year,	  and	  improved	  quality	  of	  teacher	  preparation	  programs	  (NCEE,	  1983).	  	  Because	  the	  report’s	  alarming	  message	  used	  standardized	  test	  scores	  to	  point	  out	  the	  nation’s	  problems,	  and	  because	  policymakers	  had	  grown	  fond	  of	  test-­‐based	  policies,	  A	  Nation	  at	  Risk	  led	  to	  a	  nationwide	  increase	  in	  testing	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and	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policies	  that	  attached	  school-­‐level	  incentives	  to	  test	  scores	  (Hamilton,	  2003).	  	  	  
Standards-­‐based	  reform.	  	  Shortly	  after	  A	  Nation	  at	  Risk	  was	  released,	  Secretary	  of	  Education	  T.	  H.	  Bell	  began	  publishing	  comparative	  state	  data.	  	  More	  states	  began	  creating	  their	  own	  tests	  and	  accountability	  policies	  in	  attempts	  to	  out-­‐shine	  neighboring	  states,	  prompting	  physician	  John	  Cannell	  to	  point	  to	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  “Lake	  Wobegon”	  effect,	  wherein	  a	  majority	  of	  students	  in	  any	  given	  state	  were	  labeled	  “above	  average”	  (Ravitch,	  2010).	  	  Beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  focus	  turned	  to	  the	  quality	  and	  rigor	  of	  standards	  (Goertz,	  2007)	  as	  educators	  became	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  results-­‐oriented	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  states	  (Kress	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  In	  1989,	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Teachers	  of	  Mathematics	  (NCTM)	  published	  a	  national	  set	  of	  standards,	  which	  detailed	  what	  all	  mathematics	  students	  should	  know	  and	  be	  able	  to	  do	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  schooling	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  Later	  that	  year,	  President	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  invited	  governors	  and	  other	  administrators	  to	  a	  national	  summit	  on	  education	  in	  Charlottesville,	  Virginia;	  the	  summit	  attendees	  established	  the	  National	  Education	  Goals	  Panel	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  with	  input-­‐driven	  reform	  and	  the	  philosophical	  shift	  towards	  standards-­‐based,	  outcomes-­‐oriented	  reform	  (Ravitch,	  2010).	  
Two	  years	  after	  the	  Charlottesville	  summit,	  President	  Bush	  recommended	  voluntary	  national	  standards	  and	  tests	  but	  was	  unsuccessful	  at	  convincing	  Congress	  to	  adopt	  them	  (Jennings,	  2012;	  Ravitch,	  2010;	  Spring,	  2005).	  	  By	  that	  time,	  however,	  educators	  and	  other	  concerned	  citizens	  were	  pushing	  for	  more	  rigorous	  standards.	  	  In	  1991,	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education	  began	  awarding	  grants	  to	  consortia	  of	  professional	  groups	  of	  educators	  and	  academics	  to	  develop	  voluntary	  national	  standards	  in	  several	  subjects	  (Ravitch,	  2010).	  	  Many	  of	  these	  consortia	  were	  well	  underway	  with	  writing	  efforts	  when,	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1994,	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Lynne	  Cheney	  criticized	  the	  national	  history	  standards	  for	  being	  biased	  (Ravitch,	  2010).	  	  Ravitch	  claimed	  that,	  “the	  [national]	  standards	  movement	  died	  in	  1995,	  when	  the	  controversy	  over	  the	  national	  history	  standards	  came	  to	  a	  high	  boil”	  (2010,	  p.	  20).	  	  	  
Improving	  America’s	  Schools	  Act.	  	  That	  same	  year,	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  signed	  a	  reauthorization	  of	  the	  ESEA,	  entitled	  the	  Improving	  America’s	  Schools	  Act	  (IASA).	  	  The	  IASA	  required	  states	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  standards,	  assessments	  aligned	  to	  these	  standards,	  and	  a	  method	  to	  identify	  low-­‐performing	  schools	  (Kress	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  President	  Clinton	  also	  signed	  the	  Goals	  2000	  Educate	  America	  Act	  of	  1994,	  which	  granted	  federal	  money	  to	  states	  so	  that	  they	  could	  write	  their	  own	  standards	  (Goertz,	  2007;	  Ravitch,	  2010).	  	  Even	  though	  all	  states	  complied	  with	  IASA,	  a	  large	  variance	  existed	  in	  state	  definitions	  of	  “success”	  and	  consequences	  for	  not	  achieving	  “success”	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  For	  example,	  in	  1999-­‐2000,	  some	  states,	  such	  as	  Texas,	  North	  Carolina,	  and	  Florida,	  tied	  particularly	  strict	  repercussions	  to	  school	  accountability	  measures,	  while	  states	  such	  as	  Iowa,	  Colorado,	  Maine,	  and	  Montana	  had	  no	  school	  accountability	  measures	  at	  all	  (Carnoy	  &	  Loeb,	  2002).	  	  Testing	  policy	  varied	  hugely	  from	  state	  to	  state,	  as	  well.	  	  Even	  though	  all	  states	  had	  tests	  that	  were	  aligned	  to	  their	  state	  standards,	  the	  grades	  tested,	  length,	  and	  types	  of	  tests	  were	  very	  different	  (Carnoy	  &	  Loeb,	  2002).	  	  	  
Defining	  accountability.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  the	  large	  variance	  in	  accountability	  policies	  was	  that	  the	  word	  “accountability”	  was	  not	  very	  well	  defined.	  	  Linn	  (2000)	  described	  it	  this	  way:	  “accountability	  programs	  took	  a	  variety	  of	  forms,	  but	  shared	  the	  common	  characteristic	  that	  they	  increased	  real	  or	  perceived	  stakes	  of	  results	  for	  teachers	  and	  educational	  administrators”	  (p.	  7).	  	  Overall,	  two	  main	  types	  of	  accountability	  systems	  exist	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  	  




Figure	  2.	  	  Types	  of	  accountability	  policies.	  Although	  both	  types	  of	  policies	  in	  Figure	  2	  may	  have	  report	  card	  components,	  what	  the	  governing	  bodies	  do	  after	  the	  grades	  are	  reported	  determines	  the	  type	  of	  accountability	  policy.	  	  One	  type	  of	  accountability	  system	  provides	  explicit	  consequences	  to	  performance,	  called	  “consequential”	  by	  Hanushek	  and	  Raymond	  (2005,	  p.	  306)	  or	  “government-­‐based	  accountability”	  by	  Harris	  and	  Herrington	  (2006,	  p.	  217).	  	  This	  type	  of	  consequential	  or	  government-­‐based	  accountability	  is	  further	  split	  into	  what	  Diane	  Ravitch	  called	  “positive	  accountability,”	  where	  states	  are	  mainly	  focused	  on	  helping	  schools,	  and	  “punitive	  accountability,”	  where	  states	  are	  focused	  mainly	  on	  reconstitution	  or	  closing	  of	  schools	  (2010,	  p.	  163).	  	  The	  other	  main	  type	  of	  accountability	  system	  only	  reports	  test	  results	  publicly,	  and	  allows	  the	  public	  to	  make	  the	  decision	  of	  what	  to	  do	  next.	  	  This	  approach	  has	  been	  dubbed	  “report	  card”	  accountability	  by	  Hanushek	  and	  Raymond	  (2005,	  p.	  306)	  and	  “market-­‐based	  accountability”	  by	  Harris	  and	  Herrington	  (2006,	  p.	  221).	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accountability	  and	  testing	  policies	  (Goertz,	  2007;	  Kress	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  NCLB	  required	  that	  states	  set	  more	  ambitious	  goals	  and	  more	  rigorous	  standards,	  increase	  the	  quality	  and	  quantity	  of	  testing,	  establish	  more	  serious	  consequences	  for	  poor	  test	  performance,	  and	  report	  test	  results	  by	  subgroups	  to	  expose	  and	  eliminate	  achievement	  gaps	  (Mills,	  2008;	  Spring,	  2011).	  	  Although	  the	  improvement	  goals	  were	  the	  same	  for	  each	  state	  (i.e.,	  that	  all	  students	  would	  be	  “proficient”	  by	  2014),	  NCLB	  allowed	  each	  state	  to	  once	  again	  develop	  its	  own	  standards	  and	  tests	  and	  to	  create	  its	  own	  definition	  for	  determining	  “proficiency”	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  Spring	  (2011)	  described	  NCLB	  as	  a	  large	  step	  toward	  “a	  nationalized	  school	  system	  with	  state	  and	  local	  school	  authorities	  becoming	  conduits	  for	  federal	  policies”	  (p.	  65).	  
The	  number	  of	  states	  with	  some	  version	  of	  a	  consequential	  accountability	  model	  increased	  from	  12	  states	  in	  1996	  to	  39	  states	  in	  2000;	  by	  2002,	  all	  states	  had	  a	  consequential	  accountability	  model	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  NCLB	  (Hanushek	  &	  Raymond,	  2005).	  	  Although	  the	  various	  states	  had	  different	  policies,	  they	  all	  had	  to	  participate	  in	  NAEP	  assessment.	  	  The	  effects	  of	  accountability	  and	  high-­‐stakes	  testing	  policies,	  including	  NCLB,	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
Effects	  of	  High-­‐Stakes	  Testing	  Accountability	  Policies	  NCLB’s	  accountability	  plan	  placed	  a	  premium	  on	  “scientifically	  based	  research.”	  	  As	  such,	  researchers	  were	  required	  to	  measure	  the	  intended	  effects	  of	  education	  on	  student	  learning	  and	  compare	  the	  results	  to	  the	  policy’s	  stated	  goals,	  such	  as	  (a)	  increasing	  student	  test	  scores	  or	  (b)	  reducing	  the	  achievement	  gap.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  things,	  researchers	  have	  also	  focused	  on	  some	  of	  the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  NCLB	  and	  similar	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policies,	  including	  changes	  in	  (c)	  instructional	  practice,	  (d)	  data	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interpretation,	  (e)	  the	  role	  of	  testing,	  (f)	  teacher	  perspectives,	  (g)	  school	  and	  classroom	  climate,	  (h)	  motivation,	  (i)	  instructional	  leadership	  of	  principals,	  and	  (j)	  centralization.	  	  
Increasing	  student	  test	  scores.	  	  A	  clear	  measure	  of	  accountability	  systems	  is	  “whether	  they	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  test	  scores”	  (Carnoy	  &	  Loeb,	  2002,	  p.	  308).	  	  The	  academic	  achievement	  effects	  of	  accountability	  policies	  such	  as	  NCLB	  have	  been	  an	  area	  of	  great	  debate	  among	  educational	  researchers.	  	  NCLB	  was	  predicated	  in	  part	  on	  Grissmer	  and	  Flanagan’s	  (1998)	  study,	  which	  highlighted	  dramatic	  NAEP	  gains	  in	  North	  Carolina	  and	  Texas	  following	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policies	  (Hamilton,	  2003;	  Lee,	  2008).	  	  However,	  soon	  after	  NCLB	  was	  enacted,	  Amrein	  and	  Berliner	  (2002)	  rebutted	  Grissmer	  and	  Flanagan’s	  claims,	  stating	  that	  the	  gains	  in	  North	  Carolina	  and	  Texas	  were	  attributable	  to	  the	  increasing	  exclusion	  rates	  from	  testing,	  where	  school	  administrators	  suspended,	  retained,	  expelled,	  or	  reclassified	  selected	  students	  prior	  to	  the	  test.	  	  	  
Some	  researchers	  reported	  positive	  effects,	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Grissmer	  and	  Flanagan	  (e.g.,	  Bishop	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Carnoy	  &	  Loeb,	  2002;	  Hanushek	  &	  Raymond,	  2005;	  Harris	  &	  Herrington,	  2006;	  Stullich	  et	  al.,	  2006)	  whereas	  others	  (e.g.,	  Lee,	  2008;	  Lee	  &	  Wong,	  2004;	  Nichols,	  Glass,	  &	  Berliner,	  2006;	  Wei,	  2012)	  found	  negative	  or	  no	  effects	  of	  accountability	  policies.	  	  Some	  studies	  reported	  mixed	  or	  diminishing	  effects	  (e.g.,	  Chudowsky,	  Chudowsky,	  &	  Kober,	  2007;	  Dee	  &	  Jacob,	  2011;	  Fuller,	  Gesicki,	  Kang,	  &	  Wright,	  2007;	  Jacob,	  2005;	  Lee	  &	  Reeves,	  2012;	  Nichols,	  Glass,	  &	  Berliner,	  2012).	  	  Most	  studies	  with	  mixed	  results	  showed	  an	  improvement	  in	  mathematics	  NAEP	  scores—particularly	  in	  4th	  grade—but	  not	  in	  reading.	  	  In	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  about	  test-­‐driven	  external	  accountability	  policy,	  Lee	  (2008)	  noted	  that	  the	  average	  Cohen’s	  d	  effect	  size	  for	  studies	  on	  academic	  achievement	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  (M	  =	  .47)	  was	  significantly	  larger	  than	  the	  average	  effect	  size	  from	  either	  the	  1980s	  (M	  =	  .08)	  or	  the	  early	  1990s	  (M	  =	  −.13),	  prior	  to	  the	  full	  implementation	  of	  IASA	  and	  NCLB.	  	  This	  may	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mean	  that	  overall,	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  does	  have	  a	  positive	  effect,	  however	  slight	  and	  varied,	  at	  least	  in	  terms	  of	  scores	  on	  large-­‐scale	  achievement	  tests.	  
Methodologies	  for	  these	  studies	  have	  varied	  widely,	  but	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  researchers	  have	  used	  NAEP	  as	  an	  external	  evaluative	  measure,	  although	  some	  older	  studies	  used	  state	  test	  scores.	  	  In	  their	  literature	  review,	  Nichols,	  Glass,	  and	  Berliner	  (2012)	  sorted	  the	  extant	  literature	  into	  three	  groups,	  based	  on	  methodology:	  (a)	  comparisons	  of	  achievement	  in	  states	  with	  a	  longer	  history	  of	  accountability	  policy	  to	  those	  with	  a	  shorter	  history	  (e.g.,	  Amrein	  &	  Berliner,	  2002;	  Dee	  &	  Jacob,	  2009,	  2011;	  Lee,	  2008),	  (b)	  correlation	  or	  regression	  techniques	  to	  determine	  the	  relationship	  between	  some	  ranking	  based	  on	  accountability	  stringency	  and	  achievement	  (e.g.,	  Carnoy	  &	  Loeb,	  2002;	  Hanushek	  &	  Raymond,	  2005),	  and	  (c)	  focused	  study	  on	  one	  particular	  aspect	  of	  policy	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  specific	  areas	  of	  the	  country	  (e.g.,	  Neal	  &	  Schanzenbach,	  2010).	  	  Figlio	  and	  Ladd	  (2008)	  pointed	  to	  three	  studies	  that	  they	  considered	  the	  most	  methodologically	  sound	  (i.e.,	  Carnoy	  &	  Loeb,	  2002;	  Jacob,	  2005;	  Hanushek	  &	  Raymond,	  2005).	  	  However,	  Hamilton	  (2003)	  noted	  that	  all	  research	  on	  effects	  of	  large-­‐scale	  assessment	  has	  major	  limitations,	  including	  difficulty	  of	  obtaining	  permission	  to	  use	  data,	  difficulty	  of	  devising	  a	  true	  causal	  experimental	  study,	  diversity	  of	  state	  policy	  and	  programs,	  and	  poor	  measurement	  of	  the	  “construct	  of	  interest”	  resulting	  from	  non-­‐representative	  sampling	  or	  non-­‐random	  refusal	  (p.	  32).	  
Reducing	  the	  achievement	  gap.	  	  After	  the	  passage	  of	  NCLB,	  educational	  agencies	  could	  “no	  longer	  ignore	  students	  with	  learning	  disabilities,	  those	  who	  have	  limited	  English	  proficiency,	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  minorities,	  and	  those	  who	  come	  from	  low-­‐income	  families”	  (Wong,	  2013,	  p.	  411).	  	  	  However,	  more	  evidence	  exists	  to	  support	  no	  change,	  or	  even	  an	  increase,	  in	  the	  achievement	  gap	  since	  NCLB.	  	  Harris	  and	  Herrington	  (2006)	  referred	  to	  an	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increasing	  achievement	  gap	  in	  NAEP	  scores,	  “reversing	  decades	  of	  steady	  improvement	  in	  outcome	  equity”	  (p.	  209).	  	  Others	  (Hanushek	  &	  Raymond,	  2005;	  Watanabe,	  2008)	  also	  documented	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  Black-­‐White	  achievement	  gap	  via	  re-­‐segregation	  and	  superficial	  teaching.	  	  Lee	  found	  no	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  racial	  achievement	  gap	  in	  his	  2004	  study	  with	  Wong	  or	  his	  2008	  meta-­‐analysis	  on	  test-­‐driven	  external	  accountability	  policy,	  but	  later	  reported	  with	  Reeves	  (2012)	  a	  narrowing	  achievement	  gap	  “associated	  with	  long-­‐term	  statewide	  instructional	  capacity	  and	  teacher	  resources	  rather	  than	  short-­‐term	  NCLB	  implementation”	  (p.	  209).	  	  	  
Some	  evidence	  exists	  to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  accountability	  policies	  have	  not	  changed	  or	  have	  jeopardized	  minority	  student	  achievement.	  	  Wei	  (2012)	  concluded	  in	  her	  study,	  “NCLB	  state	  accountability	  policy	  has	  not	  created	  equal	  outcomes	  across	  different	  academic	  subjects	  and	  racial	  groups”	  (p.	  297).	  	  Some	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Diamond	  &	  Spillane,	  2004;	  Watanabe,	  2008)	  have	  documented	  higher	  proportions	  of	  Black	  students	  in	  schools	  or	  courses	  focused	  solely	  on	  superficial	  test	  preparation.	  	  	  
Instructional	  practice.	  	  Test-­‐based	  accountability	  policy	  has	  had	  consequences	  that	  were	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  original	  stated	  intents.	  	  Written	  by	  a	  joint	  committee	  including	  the	  American	  Educational	  Research	  Association	  (AERA),	  American	  Psychological	  Association	  (APA),	  &	  the	  National	  Council	  on	  Measurement	  in	  Education	  (NCME),	  the	  
Standards	  for	  Educational	  and	  Psychological	  Testing	  specifically	  indicate	  that	  consequences	  should	  be	  studied	  as	  part	  of	  any	  validity	  investigation	  (Joint	  Committee	  on	  Standards	  for	  Educational	  and	  Psychological	  Testing	  [JCSEPT],	  1999).	  	  Further,	  validity	  considerations	  become	  critically	  important	  in	  high-­‐stakes	  environments:	  “An	  examination	  of	  consequences	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  testing	  programs	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  serve	  as	  policy	  tools”	  (Hamilton,	  2003,	  p.	  26).	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With	  increased	  consequences,	  testing	  can	  become	  a	  “central	  preoccupation	  in	  the	  schools”	  and	  “not	  just	  a	  measure	  but	  an	  end	  in	  itself”	  (Ravitch,	  2010,	  pp.	  12-­‐13).	  	  Tests	  may	  “seem	  to	  exert	  a	  more	  powerful	  influence	  than	  standards”	  (Hamilton,	  2003,	  p.	  36).	  	  Educators	  and	  students	  feel	  pressure	  under	  a	  consequential	  accountability	  system	  to	  perform	  by	  any	  means	  necessary,	  perhaps	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  other	  important	  goals	  of	  the	  organization	  (Ravitch,	  2010).	  	  For	  many	  teachers,	  this	  translates	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  narrowing	  the	  curriculum	  to	  only	  what	  is	  assessed	  on	  high-­‐stakes	  tests	  and	  coaching	  students	  about	  how	  to	  answer	  quickly	  and	  accurately,	  given	  the	  testing	  method	  (Darling-­‐Hammond,	  2004;	  Goertz,	  2007;	  Hamilton,	  2003;	  Kim,	  2010;	  Linn,	  2000;	  Ravitch,	  2010).	  	  However,	  these	  practices	  can	  contribute	  to	  unfair	  consequences	  based	  on	  inflated	  scores	  and	  corresponding	  invalid	  inferences.	  	  
Superficial	  test	  preparation	  and	  familiarity	  of	  test	  format	  result	  in	  a	  predictable	  pattern	  of	  test	  scores:	  a	  somewhat	  low	  minimum	  score	  after	  the	  first	  year	  of	  implementation,	  followed	  by	  a	  spike	  in	  each	  of	  the	  next	  several	  years	  as	  students	  and	  educators	  learn	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  test	  (Carnoy	  &	  Loeb,	  2002;	  Jacob,	  2005).	  	  These	  negative	  consequences	  of	  testing	  are	  not	  new;	  a	  narrowing	  of	  the	  curricular	  focus	  was	  documented	  during	  the	  minimum	  competency	  era	  of	  the	  1970s,	  when	  consequential	  accountability	  pertaining	  to	  graduation	  became	  widespread,	  and	  has	  since	  followed	  with	  other	  high-­‐stakes	  testing	  programs	  (Hamilton,	  2003;	  Linn,	  2000).	  	  However,	  Hanushek	  and	  Raymond	  (2005)	  contended	  that	  reports	  of	  negative	  impacts	  such	  as	  narrowing	  of	  the	  curriculum	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  overstated.	  
Similar	  to	  narrowing	  of	  the	  curriculum	  or	  teaching	  to	  the	  test,	  another	  phenomenon	  arising	  out	  of	  making	  test	  scores	  the	  “primary	  measure	  of	  school	  quality”	  (Ravitch,	  2010,	  p.	  15)	  is	  the	  tendency	  to	  focus	  on	  bubble	  students,	  or	  students	  who	  have	  scored	  close	  to	  but	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just	  below	  the	  proficiency	  cut	  score	  (Booher-­‐Jennings,	  2005;	  Jacob,	  2005).	  	  Neal	  and	  Schanzenbach,	  among	  the	  first	  to	  document	  this	  “educational	  triage”	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  over	  time,	  found	  that	  as	  proficiency	  requirements	  became	  more	  stringent,	  they	  observed	  “noteworthy	  increases	  in	  reading	  and	  math	  scores	  among	  students	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  achievement	  distribution	  but	  not	  among	  the	  least	  academically	  advantaged	  students”	  (2010,	  p.	  263).	  	  Thus,	  within	  high-­‐stakes	  testing	  environments,	  both	  students	  who	  are	  struggling	  most	  with	  the	  content	  and	  those	  who	  are	  most	  capable	  and	  need	  to	  be	  challenged	  may	  actually	  receive	  less	  attention	  from	  their	  teacher	  (Moon,	  Brighton,	  Jarvis,	  &	  Hall,	  2007).	  
Data	  interpretation.	  	  Data	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  accountability	  systems,	  and	  “accountability	  occurs	  only	  when	  a	  useful	  set	  of	  processes	  exists	  for	  interpreting	  and	  acting	  on	  information	  in	  educationally	  productive	  ways”	  (Darling-­‐Hammond,	  2010,	  p.	  1081).	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  common	  criticisms	  about	  the	  implementation	  of	  high-­‐stakes	  testing	  policies	  originates	  from	  the	  field	  of	  psychometrics.	  	  Tests	  are	  limited	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  provide	  “a	  sample	  of	  examinee	  behavior	  under	  certain,	  very	  specific	  conditions”	  (Hamilton,	  2003,	  p.	  26).	  	  Professional	  research	  communities	  are	  clear	  that	  a	  single	  test	  score	  alone	  should	  not	  be	  used	  to	  make	  decisions	  about	  promotion	  or	  retention	  (National	  Research	  Council	  [NRC],	  1999),	  or	  any	  other	  high-­‐stakes	  decision	  (JCSEPT,	  1999;	  APA,	  2013).	  	  Many	  other	  types	  of	  measurements	  can	  be	  used	  for	  these	  purposes;	  for	  example,	  Ravitch	  (2010)	  suggested	  teacher-­‐derived	  performance	  measures	  such	  as	  grades,	  participation,	  and	  homework.	  	  	  
Although	  NCLB	  allowed	  for	  multiple	  assessments,	  problems	  with	  technical	  quality	  of	  informal	  assessments,	  coupled	  with	  curricular	  alignment	  requirements,	  prohibited	  most	  states	  from	  finding	  cost-­‐effective	  methods	  of	  production	  (Lee,	  2008).	  	  However,	  the	  unseen	  cost	  of	  basing	  important	  educational	  judgments	  on	  limited	  evidence	  is	  a	  loss	  of	  validity.	  	  Worse,	  the	  cost-­‐effective	  practice	  of	  administering	  the	  same	  testing	  instruments	  repeatedly	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can	  “distort	  instruction	  and	  lead	  to	  inflated	  and	  non-­‐generalizable	  estimates	  of	  student	  gains	  in	  achievement”	  (Linn,	  2000,	  p.	  6).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  repeated	  use	  of	  the	  same	  test	  encourages	  superficial	  recall-­‐based	  instructional	  methods,	  score	  inflation,	  and	  “teaching	  to	  the	  test.”	  	  This	  practice	  hampers	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  test	  results	  to	  show	  accurate	  (i.e.,	  valid)	  trends	  in	  student	  learning	  over	  time.	  	  
Score	  inflation,	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  high-­‐stakes	  accountability	  assumptions,	  occurs	  when	  test	  scores	  over-­‐estimate	  what	  students	  actually	  know	  or	  can	  do.	  	  Score	  inflation	  is	  similar	  to	  monetary	  inflation,	  where	  a	  higher	  price	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  goods.	  	  Those	  not	  aware	  of	  score	  inflation	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  validity	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  generalize	  a	  test	  score	  to	  a	  broader	  domain,	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  test.	  	  However,	  how	  much	  value	  would	  they	  place	  on	  a	  score	  if	  they	  knew	  it	  carried	  less	  meaning?	  	  Hamilton	  (2003)	  credits	  John	  Cannell	  as	  the	  first	  to	  bring	  nationwide	  attention	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  score	  inflation	  when	  he	  discovered	  that	  most	  districts	  and	  states	  were	  reporting	  higher-­‐than-­‐national	  average	  scores.	  	  It	  is	  statistically	  impossible	  for	  a	  majority	  of	  scores	  in	  any	  group	  to	  be	  above	  the	  average	  of	  that	  group,	  so	  how	  could	  this	  happen?	  	  Linn	  (2000)	  offered	  some	  possible	  explanations:	  
the	  use	  of	  old	  norms,	  the	  repeated	  use	  of	  the	  same	  test	  from	  year	  after	  year,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  students	  from	  participation	  in	  accountability	  testing	  programs	  at	  a	  higher	  rate	  than	  they	  are	  excluded	  from	  norming	  studies,	  and	  the	  narrow	  focusing	  of	  instruction	  on	  the	  skills	  and	  question	  types	  used	  on	  the	  test.	  (p.	  7)	  	  	  
To	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  of	  score	  inflation,	  Koretz	  and	  Béguin	  (2010)	  made	  the	  recommendation	  to	  minimize	  repeated	  use	  of	  tests	  and	  test	  items,	  expand	  the	  variety	  of	  types	  of	  tasks	  used	  on	  tests,	  and	  reduce	  the	  stakes	  for	  the	  tests	  by	  allowing	  for	  other	  types	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of	  accountability	  information	  sources.	  	  Another	  way	  to	  audit	  tests	  for	  score	  inflation	  is	  to	  calculate	  correlations	  between	  and	  mean	  trends	  among	  the	  high-­‐stakes	  test	  in	  question	  and	  another,	  lower	  stakes	  test	  (Hamilton,	  2003).	  
Another	  issue	  is	  the	  limited	  information	  evaluators	  may	  derive	  from	  multiple-­‐choice	  responses.	  	  Indeed,	  educators	  may	  feel	  erroneously	  that	  “selecting	  a	  correct	  answer	  among	  limited	  options	  on	  a	  timed	  test	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  only	  valid	  way	  of	  demonstrating	  knowledge”	  (Kim,	  2010,	  p.	  17).	  	  By	  contrast,	  performance-­‐based	  assessments	  that	  involve	  more	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  and	  require	  extended	  responses	  are	  favored	  in	  the	  literature	  (e.g.,	  Kim,	  2010;	  Perie	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  as	  a	  more	  accurate	  way	  to	  measure	  the	  breadth	  of	  student	  learning.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  developing	  such	  tests	  prohibits	  their	  use	  (Pilotin,	  2013).	  	  This	  limitation	  has	  led	  some	  states	  to	  drop	  highly	  complex	  material	  from	  assessments,	  and	  therefore	  curriculum,	  because	  it	  cannot	  be	  tested	  using	  multiple-­‐choice	  questions	  (Pilotin,	  2013).	  	  	  
Finally,	  states	  have	  different	  definitions	  of	  “proficiency”	  as	  required	  by	  NCLB.	  	  The	  tests	  are	  different	  for	  each	  state,	  and	  the	  process	  of	  setting	  cut	  scores	  for	  different	  performance	  levels	  is	  different	  for	  each	  state.	  	  In	  practice,	  the	  performance	  setting	  process	  is	  “inherently	  judgmental,”	  but	  that	  fact	  “is	  rarely	  communicated	  to	  the	  public”	  (Hamilton,	  2003,	  p.	  46).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  illusion	  of	  objectivity	  remains,	  and	  high-­‐stakes	  decisions	  continue	  to	  be	  made	  based	  on	  limited	  or	  missing	  information.	  
Policymakers’	  ongoing	  penchant	  for	  overgeneralizing	  results	  of	  one	  test	  is	  perhaps	  the	  result	  of	  ignorance	  about	  basic	  psychometric	  principles,	  paired	  with	  pressure	  from	  the	  public	  to	  produce	  affordable	  accountability	  systems.	  	  As	  Ravitch	  put	  it,	  “Elected	  officials	  assumed	  the	  tests	  were	  good	  enough	  to	  do	  what	  they	  were	  supposed	  to	  do—measure	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student	  performance—and	  that	  a	  test	  is	  a	  test;	  they	  did	  not	  give	  much	  thought	  to	  such	  technical	  issues	  as	  validity	  or	  reliability.	  	  Everyone,	  it	  seemed,	  wanted	  ‘accountability’”	  (2010,	  p.	  95).	  	  	  
School	  and	  classroom	  climate.	  	  Several	  negative	  effects	  of	  high-­‐stakes	  accountability	  have	  been	  prevalently	  noted	  in	  the	  research	  on	  school	  and	  classroom	  climate.	  	  For	  example,	  Hamilton	  (2003)	  noted	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  that	  indicated	  declining	  teacher	  and	  student	  morale	  and	  increasing	  stress	  because	  of	  high-­‐stakes	  testing.	  	  Some	  researchers	  have	  argued	  that	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  has	  created	  such	  unreachable	  goals	  that	  students	  are	  dropping	  out	  of	  school	  at	  the	  highest	  rates	  ever	  (McNeil,	  Coppola,	  Radigan,	  &	  Vasquez	  Heilig,	  2008).	  	  Unrealistic	  goals	  set	  by	  external	  entities	  can	  also	  contribute	  to	  score	  inflation	  as	  students	  and	  educators	  “take	  shortcuts	  when	  they	  believe	  goals	  are	  unattainable”	  (Hamilton,	  2003,	  p.	  46).	  	  Cheating	  by	  having	  a	  teacher	  or	  administrator	  change	  student	  answers	  after	  testing	  is	  an	  extreme,	  but	  present,	  form	  of	  shortcut	  taken	  by	  desperate	  educators	  (Jacob	  &	  Levitt,	  2003).	  	  In	  Atlanta,	  35	  educators	  from	  58	  schools	  and	  the	  district	  office,	  including	  administrators,	  teachers,	  a	  school	  secretary,	  and	  former	  superintendent,	  Beverly	  Hall,	  were	  recently	  indicted	  for	  racketeering,	  conspiracy,	  and	  making	  false	  statements	  (USA	  Today,	  2013).	  	  Another	  popular	  discussion	  involves	  diminishing	  instructional	  time	  dedicated	  to	  tested	  subjects.	  	  Many	  researchers	  have	  reported	  that	  while	  the	  amount	  of	  instructional	  time	  dedicated	  to	  math	  and	  English/language	  arts	  has	  increased,	  time	  devoted	  to	  other	  subjects	  has	  diminished	  (e.g.,	  Dee,	  Jacob,	  &	  Schwartz,	  2013;	  McMurrer,	  2008;	  Rentner	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  leading	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  what	  is	  assessed	  is	  what	  is	  taught.	  
However,	  not	  all	  studies	  include	  evidence	  of	  negative	  effects	  on	  schools	  and	  classrooms.	  	  In	  a	  recent	  study,	  Dee,	  Jacob,	  and	  Schwartz	  (2013)	  used	  financial	  district	  data	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and	  pooled	  cross	  sections	  of	  teacher	  and	  principal	  surveys	  to	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  accountability	  reforms	  such	  as	  NCLB	  on	  education	  policies	  and	  practices	  in	  schools.	  	  They	  found	  that	  per-­‐pupil	  spending	  increased	  after	  NCLB	  by	  almost	  $600,	  teacher	  compensation	  increased,	  as	  did	  the	  number	  of	  elementary	  teachers	  with	  advanced	  degrees.	  	  In	  the	  same	  study,	  Dee	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  reported	  evidence	  that	  NCLB	  led	  to	  improvements	  in	  teacher-­‐reported	  absenteeism,	  tardiness,	  and	  apathy.	  
Centralization.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  traditional	  and	  indoctrinated	  principles	  in	  the	  U.S.	  educational	  system	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  local	  control	  (Pilotin,	  2013).	  	  How,	  then,	  did	  the	  U.S.	  develop	  this	  increasingly	  standardized	  and	  centralized	  state	  of	  education?	  	  One	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  competitive	  nature	  of	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  increased	  around	  the	  world	  after	  reports	  such	  as	  A	  Nation	  at	  Risk	  highlighted	  international	  math	  and	  science	  tests	  and	  rankings,	  leading	  to	  the	  “global	  educational	  reform	  movement”	  (Sahlberg,	  2008,	  p.	  47).	  	  Another	  explanation	  is	  that	  education	  has	  also	  long	  been	  offered	  as	  the	  method	  for	  nations	  to	  regain	  economic	  strength	  in	  what	  Spring	  (2011)	  called	  the	  “human	  capital	  paradigm.”	  	  This	  link	  between	  education	  and	  economic	  strength	  was	  emphasized	  in	  
A	  Nation	  at	  Risk.	  	  Both	  the	  global	  competitiveness	  and	  economic	  strength	  arguments	  introduce	  external	  factors;	  however,	  the	  former	  encourages	  strict	  adherence	  to	  a	  centralized	  curriculum	  whereas	  the	  latter	  encourages	  notions	  of	  innovation	  and	  risk-­‐taking	  (Sahlberg,	  2008).	  	  Yet	  another	  explanation	  for	  increased	  centralization	  is	  that	  federal	  categorical	  aid	  for	  education,	  which	  began	  in	  the	  1950s,	  has	  always	  been	  tied	  to	  requirements	  of	  local	  and	  state	  educational	  agencies	  (Spring,	  2011).	  	  
Because	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policies	  such	  as	  NCLB	  have	  resulted	  in	  increased	  centralization,	  decisions	  about	  things	  such	  as	  what	  to	  teach	  and	  assess	  are	  increasingly	  made	  outside	  of	  the	  local	  arena	  (Spring,	  2011),	  posing	  a	  threat	  to	  traditional	  instructional	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jurisdiction	  within	  local	  schools	  (Rutledge,	  2010)	  and	  earning	  the	  title,	  the	  “New	  Talyorism”	  (Au,	  2011,	  p.	  25).	  	  However,	  some	  argue	  that	  today’s	  increased	  global	  mobility,	  communication,	  and	  competition	  necessitate	  a	  movement	  toward	  a	  more	  centralized	  educational	  system	  that	  supports	  state	  experimentation	  and	  dissemination	  of	  best	  practices	  (e.g.,	  Pilotin,	  2013).	  	  	  
A	  key	  player	  in	  the	  centralization	  movement	  of	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policy	  has	  been	  the	  local	  school	  district.	  	  District	  personnel	  have	  gained	  authority	  to	  initiate	  strategies	  and	  programs	  to	  achieve	  the	  educational	  expectations	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  agencies.	  	  One	  of	  the	  first	  ways	  that	  districts	  became	  involved	  in	  this	  work	  was	  to	  align	  curriculum	  and	  instruction	  to	  state	  standards	  and	  tests,	  pupil	  progression	  plans,	  and	  other	  district	  policies	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  Many	  districts	  have	  responded	  to	  the	  pressure	  of	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  by	  providing	  instructional	  assistance	  to	  schools	  in	  the	  form	  of	  professional	  development	  and	  coaching,	  generating	  student	  data	  reports,	  and	  publishing	  curriculum	  guides	  and	  other	  documents	  to	  support	  aligned	  instruction	  in	  the	  schools	  (Chudowsky	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Goertz,	  2007).	  	  
Teacher	  perspectives.	  	  Teachers	  have	  voiced	  concerns	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  state	  tests	  (Abrams,	  Pedulla,	  &	  Madaus,	  2003;	  Goertz,	  2007;	  Lile,	  2012;	  Pedulla,	  Abrams,	  Madaus,	  Russell,	  Ramos,	  &	  Miao,	  2003).	  	  In	  2012,	  Scholastic,	  with	  support	  from	  the	  Bill	  and	  Melinda	  Gates	  Foundation,	  conducted	  a	  survey	  of	  more	  than	  10,000	  teachers.	  	  Scholastic	  found	  that	  teachers	  “say	  standardized	  tests	  alone	  cannot	  provide	  a	  complete	  understanding	  of	  either	  student	  achievement	  or	  teacher	  performance.	  	  They	  are	  clear	  in	  their	  call	  for	  multiple,	  more	  frequent	  measures	  of	  teaching	  and	  learning”	  (2012,	  p.	  25).	  	  Many	  teachers	  despise	  the	  use	  of	  a	  solitary	  test	  to	  measure	  student	  learning	  (Spring,	  2011).	  	  Test-­‐based	  accountability	  policies	  have	  made	  some	  teachers	  feel	  wedged	  between	  two	  seemingly	  disparate	  forces:	  the	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socio-­‐moral	  purposes	  of	  teaching	  and	  efficiency-­‐driven	  education	  based	  on	  achievement	  (Sahlberg,	  2008).	  	  As	  pressure	  to	  perform	  increases,	  so	  do	  incentives	  for	  teachers	  to	  teach	  in	  schools	  where	  “students	  are	  easy	  to	  teach	  and	  school	  stability	  is	  high”	  (Darling-­‐Hammond,	  2004,	  p.	  1058).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  sizable	  proportion	  of	  students	  with	  the	  greatest	  needs	  are	  attending	  schools	  that,	  by	  their	  nature,	  disincentive	  teachers	  who	  choose	  to	  teach	  there	  (Kozol,	  1991).	  
However,	  in	  light	  of	  recent	  changes	  to	  educational	  policy,	  teachers	  have	  reported	  that	  they	  are	  concentrating	  more	  on	  struggling	  students,	  attempting	  novel	  teaching	  methods	  to	  reach	  them,	  and	  raising	  their	  expectations	  for	  these	  students	  (Desimone,	  2013).	  	  Further,	  in	  her	  study	  of	  educators	  in	  32	  schools	  across	  five	  states,	  Desimone	  (2013)	  reported	  that	  although	  the	  respondents	  felt	  stress	  and	  pressure,	  they	  also	  felt	  an	  increased	  personal	  responsibility	  for	  their	  students’	  learning.	  	  Likewise,	  Goertz	  (2007)	  reported	  that	  teachers	  tend	  to	  align	  their	  instruction	  to	  the	  standards	  assessed	  on	  tests	  and	  use	  the	  data	  generated	  by	  these	  tests	  to	  “identify	  students	  who	  need	  additional	  help,	  topics	  requiring	  more	  emphasis,	  and	  gaps	  in	  curriculum	  and	  instruction”	  (p.	  11).	  	  
Many	  educators	  are	  motivated	  by	  the	  fear	  of	  punitive	  actions	  due	  to	  low	  student	  performance	  against	  themselves	  and	  their	  school	  (Diamond	  &	  Spillane,	  2004;	  Jennings,	  2012;	  Rutledge,	  2010).	  	  Teachers	  may	  respond	  to	  accountability	  policies	  by	  focusing	  more	  on	  achievement	  and	  working	  harder;	  however,	  if	  tests	  do	  not	  have	  clear,	  meaningful	  consequences	  attached	  to	  them,	  “teachers	  pay	  little	  attention”	  (Hamilton,	  2003,	  p.	  33).	  	  Testing	  “may	  also	  improve	  teachers’	  motivation	  and	  morale	  if	  it	  is	  accompanied	  by	  efforts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  school	  administration	  to	  provide	  appropriate	  learning	  opportunities”	  (Hamilton,	  2003,	  p.	  38).	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Instructional	  leadership	  of	  principals.	  	  Principals	  have	  focused	  more	  on	  external	  goals	  based	  on	  standards	  and	  test	  scores	  as	  a	  result	  of	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policies	  (Diamond	  &	  Spillane,	  2004;	  Rutledge,	  2010).	  	  Many	  principals	  reported	  that	  they	  increased	  professional	  development	  opportunities	  at	  their	  schools,	  added	  extra	  sections	  after-­‐school	  or	  during	  the	  summer	  for	  remediation,	  and	  led	  curriculum	  revision	  projects	  (Hamilton,	  2003).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  principals	  have	  also	  reported	  that	  they	  sometimes	  reassign	  teachers	  to	  improve	  the	  instructional	  quality	  for	  students	  in	  tested	  grades	  and	  subjects,	  focused	  more	  on	  short-­‐term	  goals	  than	  long-­‐term	  instructional	  change,	  and	  used	  field	  trips	  and	  parties	  as	  incentives	  for	  academic	  achievement	  (Hamilton,	  2003).	  
The	  role	  of	  testing.	  	  Following	  the	  enactment	  of	  NCLB,	  the	  role	  of	  testing	  became	  more	  prominent	  in	  accountability	  policy.	  	  Higher	  stakes	  were	  attached	  to	  test	  scores,	  including	  state	  sanctions	  and	  rewards,	  as	  well	  as	  public	  shame	  or	  glory.	  	  Even	  though	  public	  perception	  held	  that	  tests	  were	  problematic,	  some	  researchers	  were	  able	  to	  separate	  the	  test	  development	  process	  from	  the	  high-­‐stakes	  that	  were	  now	  placed	  upon	  test	  scores	  (Clune,	  1993;	  Goertz,	  2007;	  Hamilton,	  2003;	  Jennings,	  2012;	  Linn,	  2000;	  Ravitch,	  2010;	  Spring,	  2011).	  	  The	  sentiment	  expressed	  by	  Diane	  Ravitch	  (2010)	  is	  repeated	  throughout	  the	  literature:	  
The	  anti-­‐testing	  forces	  lashed	  out	  against	  the	  wrong	  target.	  	  Testing	  was	  not	  the	  problem.	  	  Tests	  can	  be	  designed	  and	  used	  well	  or	  badly.	  	  The	  problem	  was	  the	  misuse	  of	  testing	  for	  high-­‐stakes	  purposes,	  the	  belief	  that	  tests	  could	  identify	  with	  certainty	  which	  students	  should	  be	  held	  back,	  which	  teachers	  and	  principals	  should	  be	  fired	  or	  rewarded,	  and	  which	  schools	  should	  be	  closed—and	  the	  idea	  that	  these	  changes	  would	  inevitably	  produce	  better	  education.	  	  Policy	  decisions	  that	  were	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momentous	  for	  students	  and	  educators	  came	  down	  from	  elected	  officials	  who	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  limitations	  of	  testing.	  (p.	  150)	  
	   Test	  data	  are	  useful	  components	  of	  an	  accountability	  system	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  are	  “relevant,	  valid,	  timely,	  and	  useful”	  (Darling-­‐Hammond,	  2004,	  p.	  1080).	  	  However,	  test	  data	  should	  not	  represent	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  system.	  	  Campbell’s	  Law	  is	  often	  cited	  by	  opponents	  of	  high-­‐stakes	  accountability:	  "The	  more	  any	  quantitative	  social	  indicator	  is	  used	  for	  social	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  more	  subject	  it	  will	  be	  to	  corruption	  pressures	  and	  the	  more	  apt	  it	  will	  be	  to	  distort	  and	  corrupt	  the	  social	  processes	  it	  is	  intended	  to	  monitor"	  	  (Campbell,	  1976,	  p.	  49).	  	  Current	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policies	  are	  seen	  by	  some	  researchers	  as	  too	  narrowly	  focused,	  failing	  to	  consider	  fundamental	  components	  such	  as	  curriculum	  development,	  local	  leadership,	  and	  community	  contexts	  (Darling-­‐Hammond,	  2004;	  Hamilton,	  2003;	  Ravitch,	  2010;	  Sahlberg,	  2008).	  	  	  
	   Tests	  are	  also	  frequently	  used	  for	  more	  than	  one	  purpose,	  a	  practice	  advised	  against	  by	  Perie,	  Marion,	  and	  Gong	  (2009)	  and	  the	  American	  Psychological	  Association	  (2013),	  among	  others.	  	  The	  properties	  of	  a	  test	  that	  make	  it	  appropriate	  for	  providing	  instructional	  feedback	  will	  tend	  to	  make	  it	  unsuitable	  for	  accountability	  purposes,	  and	  vice	  versa	  (Hamilton,	  2003).	  	  There	  is	  no	  “royal	  road”	  to	  an	  assessment	  system	  that	  effectively	  serves	  all	  functions	  (Black	  &	  Wiliam,	  2005,	  p.	  260).	  	  The	  current	  challenge	  for	  policy	  makers	  and	  educators	  is	  to	  find	  alternative	  accountability	  frameworks	  and	  comprehensive	  assessment	  systems	  that	  include	  varying	  types	  of	  assessments	  intended	  for	  improving	  classroom	  practice	  and	  student	  achievement,	  while	  also	  avoiding	  some	  of	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  using	  any	  one	  single	  low-­‐level	  test	  (Volante	  &	  Ben	  Jaafar,	  2010).	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Race	  to	  the	  Top.	  	  In	  response	  to	  a	  recent	  national	  recession,	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  signed	  into	  law	  the	  American	  Recovery	  and	  Reinvestment	  Act	  of	  2009	  (ARRA),	  which	  was	  designed	  to	  stimulate	  the	  economy	  by	  investing	  in	  key	  areas	  (U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education,	  2009).	  	  ARRA	  included	  $4.35	  billion	  for	  the	  “Race	  to	  the	  Top”	  Fund,	  a	  competitive	  federal	  grant	  program	  that	  encouraged	  states	  to	  apply	  for	  funding	  in	  two	  phases.	  	  To	  win	  part	  of	  the	  grant	  money,	  states	  had	  to	  provide	  evidence	  that	  they	  had	  been	  successful	  in	  raising	  student	  achievement	  in	  the	  past	  and	  had	  an	  innovative	  plan	  to	  accelerate	  educational	  reforms	  in	  the	  future.	  	  States	  were	  required	  to	  include	  plans	  for	  “adopting	  standards	  and	  assessments	  that	  prepare	  students	  to	  succeed	  in	  college	  and	  the	  workplace	  and	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  global	  economy”	  and	  “building	  data	  systems	  that	  measure	  student	  growth	  and	  success,	  and	  inform	  teachers	  and	  principals	  about	  how	  they	  can	  improve	  instruction”	  (U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education,	  2009,	  p.	  2).	  	  In	  more	  concrete	  terms,	  those	  states	  competing	  for	  grant	  money	  were	  required	  to	  become	  a	  member	  of	  at	  least	  one	  national	  consortium	  of	  a	  “substantial	  amount	  of	  states”	  and	  adopt	  a	  set	  of	  common	  standards	  and	  common	  assessments	  (U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education,	  2009,	  (B)(1)(i)(b)	  and	  (B)(2)(i)(b)).	  
Improving	  testing	  policy.	  	  During	  the	  1990s,	  a	  governor	  told	  Jennings,	  “tests	  would	  be	  the	  lever	  that	  would	  bring	  about	  broad	  school	  improvement.	  	  Raising	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  teaching	  force	  and	  more	  equitably	  distributing	  good	  teachers	  were	  seen	  as	  more	  difficult	  than	  requiring	  testing	  and	  making	  public	  the	  results”	  (2012,	  p.	  6).	  	  However,	  as	  discussed	  previously,	  placing	  high	  stakes	  on	  a	  single	  test	  is	  not	  the	  ideal	  basis	  for	  accountability	  policy.	  	  So	  what	  can	  be	  done	  to	  improve	  testing	  policy?	  	  The	  first	  step	  is	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  past	  policies,	  such	  as	  NCLB.	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The	  U.S.	  is	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  its	  next	  phase	  of	  accountability;	  therefore,	  most	  of	  the	  studies	  on	  NCLB	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  baseline	  for	  RTTT	  (Wong,	  2013).	  	  There	  is	  hope	  for	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  next	  decade’s	  transition	  to	  the	  next	  phase	  of	  accountability	  (Pilotin,	  2013),	  and	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  new	  hybrid	  accountability	  structures	  will	  emerge	  (Wong,	  2013).	  	  Although	  it	  may	  be	  impossible	  to	  design	  the	  perfect	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  system,	  it	  is	  still	  worthwhile	  to	  pursue	  a	  system	  that	  maximizes	  intended	  benefits	  and	  minimizes	  negative	  unintended	  consequences	  (Feuer,	  2010).	  	  
Volante	  and	  BenJaafar	  (2010)	  offered	  three	  ways	  to	  modify	  existing	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  systems;	  states	  can	  either	  (a)	  include	  assessment	  items	  that	  elicit	  critical	  and	  higher-­‐order	  thinking	  skills,	  or	  (b)	  incorporate	  classroom-­‐based	  assessments,	  or	  (c)	  use	  classroom-­‐based	  assessments	  alone.	  	  Certainly,	  utilizing	  teacher-­‐given	  grades	  for	  accountability	  purposes	  is	  one	  way	  of	  implementing	  the	  last	  option.	  	  In	  a	  study	  comparing	  teacher-­‐assigned	  grades	  and	  standardized	  scores	  from	  the	  National	  Education	  Longitudinal	  Study	  of	  1988	  (NELS),	  Willingham,	  Pollack,	  and	  Lewis	  (2002)	  reported	  a	  moderate	  correlation	  (R	  =	  .62)	  between	  course	  grades	  and	  standardized	  scores.	  	  Other	  studies	  have	  also	  reported	  a	  correlation	  between	  teacher-­‐assigned	  grades	  and	  standardized	  test	  scores	  of	  approximately	  .5	  to	  .6	  (Bowers,	  2010;	  Brennan,	  Kim,	  Wenz-­‐Gross,	  &	  Siperstein,	  2001;	  Linn,	  2000;	  Woodruff	  &	  Ziomek,	  2004).	  	  	  
Darling-­‐Hammond	  (2004)	  noted	  that	  more	  of	  the	  accountability	  success	  stories	  came	  from	  areas	  that	  “have	  focused	  on	  broader	  notions	  of	  accountability,	  including	  investments	  in	  teacher	  knowledge	  and	  skill,	  organization	  of	  schools	  to	  support	  teacher	  and	  student	  learning,	  and	  systems	  of	  assessments	  that	  drive	  curriculum	  reform	  and	  teaching	  improvements”	  (p.	  1047).	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  Finland,	  one	  of	  the	  top	  scoring	  countries	  on	  international	  tests	  such	  as	  the	  OECD	  Programme	  for	  International	  Student	  Assessment	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(PISA)	  and	  IEA	  Trends	  in	  International	  Mathematics	  and	  Science	  Study	  (TIMSS),	  teachers	  go	  through	  an	  intense	  apprenticeship	  and	  ongoing	  professional	  development	  for	  how	  to	  assess	  their	  students	  (Sahlberg,	  2011).	  	  Finnish	  teachers	  are	  given	  the	  ultimate	  responsibility	  for	  assessing	  their	  own	  students—and	  that	  evaluation	  is	  trusted	  above	  all	  else	  (Sahlberg,	  2011).	  	  Although	  this	  is	  an	  extreme	  example	  for	  comparison	  with	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  educational	  system,	  it	  serves	  as	  one	  possibility	  for	  how	  the	  U.S.	  might	  transition	  in	  the	  future.	  
Recent	  Test-­‐Based	  Accountability	  in	  Florida	  The	  state	  of	  Florida	  placed	  fourth	  in	  phase	  2	  of	  the	  Race	  to	  the	  Top	  competition	  in	  August	  2010	  and	  received	  $700	  million	  to	  implement	  educational	  reforms.	  	  As	  Florida	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  diverse	  states	  in	  the	  country,	  its	  efforts	  in	  reshaping	  its	  public	  school	  system	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  implications	  for	  similar	  reforms	  in	  other	  states.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Florida	  Department	  of	  Education	  (FDOE),	  a	  “key	  component”	  of	  Florida’s	  successful	  bid	  for	  the	  Race	  to	  the	  Top	  funds	  focused	  on	  content	  standards	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  balanced	  assessment	  approaches	  (FDOE,	  2013c).	  	  Subsequently,	  with	  $20	  million	  of	  RTTT	  funds	  and	  through	  partnering	  with	  districts,	  the	  State	  has	  commissioned	  tests	  for	  what	  are	  known	  as	  “hard-­‐to-­‐measure”	  subjects	  such	  as	  Arts	  or	  World	  Languages	  (Fla.	  Stat.	  Ann.	  §	  1008.25	  (6),	  2013).	  	  The	  bid-­‐winning	  proposal	  from	  Florida	  pointed	  to	  its	  long-­‐standing	  history	  of	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  policies	  and	  willingness	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Differentiated	  Accountability	  pilot,	  which	  included	  a	  tiered	  support	  system	  for	  schools	  and	  districts	  that	  did	  not	  meet	  achievement	  goals	  set	  by	  the	  state	  (FDOE,	  2013c).	  
The	  state	  standardized	  testing	  program	  for	  accountability	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  Educational	  Accountability	  Act	  (Section	  229.57,	  F.S.)	  of	  1971,	  which	  mandated	  a	  statewide	  testing	  program.	  	  During	  the	  period	  between	  1974	  and	  2011,	  the	  Florida	  state	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accountability	  system	  experienced	  substantive	  revision	  in	  scope	  and	  depth.	  	  In	  1976,	  legislators	  modified	  and	  expanded	  the	  Educational	  Accountability	  Act	  to	  include	  reading,	  writing,	  and	  mathematics	  for	  students	  in	  grades	  3,	  5,	  8,	  and	  11,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  graduation	  exam	  for	  the	  graduating	  class	  of	  1979	  (Herrington	  &	  MacDonald,	  2000).	  	  Although	  control	  shifted	  back	  to	  local	  districts	  and	  schools	  with	  Blueprint	  2000	  enacted	  in	  1991	  for	  implementing	  programs	  and	  setting	  standards,	  schools	  in	  Florida	  operated	  under	  stricter	  accountability	  and	  testing	  provisions	  designed	  to	  identify	  and	  reward	  high	  performing	  schools	  while	  prescribing	  interventions	  for	  lower	  performing	  schools	  (Herrington	  &	  MacDonald,	  2000).	  	  Following	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Sunshine	  State	  Standards	  in	  1996,	  FDOE	  administered	  a	  new	  series	  of	  assessments	  entitled	  the	  Florida	  Comprehensive	  Assessment	  Test	  (FCAT).	  	  Florida	  state	  legislators	  took	  control	  once	  again	  in	  1999	  when	  they	  enacted	  the	  Accountability	  Plus	  (A+)	  plan	  and	  the	  state	  assessment	  program	  grew	  to	  include	  science	  as	  well	  as	  grades	  3-­‐10	  for	  reading	  and	  mathematics	  (Herrington	  &	  MacDonald,	  2000).	  
Florida’s	  Department	  of	  Education	  began	  revising	  the	  Florida	  Sunshine	  State	  Standards	  once	  again	  in	  2007,	  and	  named	  the	  finished	  revision	  the	  Next	  Generation	  Sunshine	  State	  Standards	  to	  reflect	  the	  change	  (FDOE,	  2007).	  	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  FCAT	  became	  FCAT	  2.0	  as	  a	  new	  assessment	  was	  required	  for	  the	  new	  Next	  Generation	  standards.	  	  The	  newly	  aligned	  Mathematics	  and	  Reading	  FCAT	  2.0	  assessments	  were	  first	  administered	  in	  the	  2010-­‐11	  school	  year.	  	  That	  same	  school	  year,	  however,	  Florida	  revised	  the	  standards	  yet	  again	  following	  the	  decision	  to	  adopt	  85%	  or	  more	  of	  the	  Common	  Core	  Standards.	  	  This	  was	  done	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  application	  requirements	  for	  the	  national	  Race	  to	  the	  Top	  grant.	  	  	  The	  next	  iteration	  of	  standards	  was	  dubbed	  the	  “2010	  Next	  Generation	  Sunshine	  State	  Standards,”	  and	  remains	  in	  effect	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  	  	  FDOE	  is	  currently	  deciding	  which	  assessment	  will	  replace	  FCAT	  2.0	  for	  the	  2014-­‐15	  school	  year.	  	  In	  a	  recent	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media	  advisory,	  FDOE	  announced	  a	  three-­‐day	  education	  accountability	  summit	  to	  discuss,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  next	  statewide	  accountability	  assessment	  (FDOE,	  2013b).	  
The	  results	  for	  the	  Grade	  6	  Mathematics	  FCAT	  2.0	  were	  reported	  in	  two	  forms	  for	  the	  2012-­‐2013	  school	  year:	  (a)	  a	  developmental	  scale	  score	  (SS)	  from	  170-­‐284	  that	  provides	  the	  ability	  to	  track	  student	  growth	  and	  progress	  over	  time	  and	  allows	  comparison	  from	  year	  to	  year	  to	  identify	  growth,	  and	  (b)	  a	  corresponding	  performance	  level	  of	  1,	  being	  the	  lowest,	  to	  5,	  the	  highest	  (FDOE,	  2013e).	  	  A	  performance	  level	  of	  3	  or	  above	  is	  considered	  proficient	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Florida.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  present	  study,	  the	  developmental	  scale	  score	  was	  used	  to	  retain	  accuracy	  and	  maximally	  model	  variation	  among	  student	  scores,	  instead	  of	  using	  the	  categorical	  performance	  level,	  which	  truncates	  differences	  measured	  by	  the	  developmental	  scores.	  
	   The	  FCAT	  2.0	  is	  not	  just	  a	  high-­‐stakes	  test	  for	  individual	  students	  in	  Florida.	  	  Schools	  across	  Florida	  receive	  a	  grade	  based	  mostly	  on	  how	  certain	  groups	  of	  students	  perform	  on	  FCAT	  2.0.	  	  Also,	  Florida	  law	  (Fla.	  Stat.	  Ann.	  §	  1012.34,	  2013)	  stipulates	  that	  50%	  of	  a	  teacher’s	  evaluation	  is	  based	  on	  observation,	  while	  the	  other	  50%	  is	  based	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  teacher’s	  students,	  including	  up	  to	  30%	  based	  on	  statewide	  assessment	  data	  for	  evaluation	  purposes	  and	  the	  other	  20%	  can	  be	  student	  outcome	  data	  specific	  to	  the	  job	  responsibility.	  	  Value-­‐Added	  Models	  (VAM)	  required	  to	  fulfill	  laws	  such	  as	  this	  are	  not	  unique	  to	  Florida;	  Tennessee	  pioneered	  the	  concept	  of	  assessing	  teachers	  based	  on	  student	  scores,	  and	  it	  has	  since	  been	  picking	  up	  favor	  and	  criticism	  around	  the	  country	  (Amrein-­‐Beardsley,	  2008;	  Hill,	  Kapitula,	  &	  Umland,	  2010;	  National	  Council	  on	  Teacher	  Quality	  [NCTQ],	  2012;	  Pullin,	  2013;	  Ready,	  2013).	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District-­‐Developed	  Interim	  Assessments	  Districts	  and	  schools	  have	  supplemented	  state	  standardized	  tests	  with	  their	  own	  assessments	  to	  measure	  progress	  and	  give	  feedback	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  (Goertz,	  2007).	  	  These	  localized	  assessment	  programs	  were	  considered	  a	  “promising	  approach	  to	  helping	  teachers	  make	  better	  use	  of	  assessment	  information”	  (Hamilton,	  2003,	  p.	  49).	  	  However,	  after	  the	  enactment	  of	  NCLB	  in	  2001,	  many	  school	  districts	  reacted	  to	  the	  increased	  pressure	  to	  raise	  test	  scores	  and	  close	  achievement	  gaps	  by	  developing	  or	  purchasing	  interim	  tests	  (Shepard,	  Davidson,	  &	  Bowman,	  2011).	  	  These	  interim,	  or	  benchmark,	  tests	  were	  administered	  periodically	  throughout	  the	  school	  year	  and	  indicated	  progress	  toward	  statewide	  test	  scores.	  	  They	  are	  now	  fairly	  widespread;	  in	  a	  national	  survey,	  82%	  of	  large	  urban	  school	  districts	  reported	  that	  they	  had	  instituted	  some	  form	  of	  interim	  assessment,	  and	  69%	  of	  these	  districts	  had	  done	  so	  following	  the	  passage	  of	  NCLB	  (Burch,	  2010).	  	  	  	  Research	  on	  interim	  or	  benchmark	  assessments	  is	  not	  as	  comprehensive	  as	  research	  on	  other	  types	  of	  assessments,	  possibly	  because	  of	  the	  meteoric	  rise	  of	  benchmark	  assessments	  to	  popularity	  among	  school	  districts	  across	  the	  United	  States	  following	  NCLB	  (Shepard	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  Although	  interim	  assessments	  were	  originally	  intended	  as	  an	  “early	  warning	  system”	  for	  state	  accountability	  tests	  (Wiliam,	  2004),	  some	  vendors	  and	  developers	  capitalized	  on	  the	  increasingly	  positive	  research	  about	  formative	  assessments	  and	  sold	  their	  interim	  assessments	  as	  “formative	  assessments”	  or	  “formative	  assessment	  systems”	  (Heritage,	  2010;	  Li	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Popham,	  2008;	  Shepard	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  This	  contributed	  to	  confusion	  between	  the	  terms	  formative	  assessment	  and	  interim	  assessment	  (Chappius,	  2005;	  Goertz,	  Olah,	  &	  Riggan,	  2010;	  Herman,	  Osmundson,	  &	  Dietel,	  2010;	  Perie	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  	  
Formative	  assessment	  versus	  interim	  assessment.	  	  In	  October	  2006,	  after	  an	  extensive	  review	  of	  the	  formative	  assessment	  literature	  and	  consultation	  with	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internationally	  recognized	  assessment	  experts,	  a	  state	  collaborative	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Chief	  State	  School	  Officers	  (CCSSO)	  attempted	  to	  resolve	  the	  confusion	  about	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  formative	  by	  issuing	  this	  definition	  (McManus,	  2008):	  Formative	  assessment	  is	  a	  process	  used	  by	  teachers	  and	  students	  during	  instruction	  that	  provides	  feedback	  to	  adjust	  ongoing	  teaching	  and	  learning	  to	  improve	  students’	  achievement	  of	  intended	  instructional	  outcomes.	  (p.	  3)	  	  The	  process	  of	  formative	  assessment	  is	  not	  effective	  simply	  because	  an	  instrument	  is	  implemented	  or	  because	  periodic	  feedback	  is	  given	  to	  students.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  607	  effect	  sizes	  about	  feedback	  interventions	  (FIs),	  Kluger	  and	  DeNisi	  (1996)	  found	  that	  even	  though	  FIs	  improved	  performance	  on	  average	  (d	  =	  .41),	  over	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  FIs	  actually	  decreased	  performance.	  	  Kluger	  and	  DeNisi	  (1996)	  reported	  negative	  mean	  effect	  sizes	  when	  the	  FI	  was	  discouraging	  (d	  =	  -­‐.14)	  and/or	  when	  the	  task	  was	  physical	  (d	  =	  -­‐.11).	  	  In	  Sadler’s	  (1989)	  early	  model	  of	  formative	  assessment,	  the	  fundamental	  purpose	  was	  to	  enable	  the	  student	  to	  come	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  teacher’s	  concept	  of	  quality,	  ultimately	  leading	  to	  student	  self-­‐monitoring.	  	  At	  a	  minimum,	  effective	  formative	  assessment	  requires	  high-­‐quality	  instruments,	  task-­‐related	  specific	  feedback	  to	  students,	  and	  student	  participation	  in	  the	  assessment	  process	  (Black	  &	  Wiliam,	  1998b;	  Shute,	  2008).	  	  Other	  essential	  elements	  include	  clear	  learning	  targets	  (Brookhart,	  2011;	  Sadler,	  1989;	  Wiliam	  &	  Thompson,	  2008);	  learning	  progressions	  usable	  as	  student	  performance	  maps	  and	  planning	  tools	  (Heritage,	  2008;	  McManus,	  Wilson,	  &	  Draney,	  2004);	  instructionally	  meaningful,	  curriculum-­‐embedded	  assessment	  tasks	  that	  reveal	  students’	  thinking	  processes	  (Shepard,	  2006);	  and	  timely	  availability	  of	  results	  (Popham,	  2006).	  Black	  and	  Wiliam	  (1998a,	  1998b)	  famously	  characterized	  the	  then	  implicit	  domain	  of	  formative	  assessment	  by	  synthesizing	  research	  on	  diverse	  fields,	  including	  teachers’	  assessment	  practices,	  feedback	  (Kluger	  &	  DeNisi,	  1996;	  Sadler,	  1989),	  self-­‐assessment,	  self-­‐
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perception,	  achievement	  motivation,	  and	  quality	  of	  tasks.	  	  From	  their	  review,	  Black	  and	  Wiliam	  (1998a,	  1998b)	  concluded	  that	  formative	  assessment	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  increase	  student	  learning	  by	  .4	  to	  .7	  standard	  deviations—much	  greater	  than	  what	  typical	  educational	  interventions	  would	  produce,	  and	  that	  low	  achievers	  realized	  the	  largest	  gains.	  	  To	  give	  perspective,	  they	  noted	  that	  if	  a	  country	  were	  to	  gain	  .7	  standard	  deviations,	  it	  would	  move	  in	  ranking	  from	  the	  middle	  to	  among	  the	  top	  five	  nations	  on	  any	  international	  test.	  	  	   Several	  contradictory	  studies	  have	  recently	  been	  published	  regarding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  formative	  assessment.	  	  For	  example,	  Bennett	  (2011)	  noted	  that	  Black	  and	  Wiliam	  (1998a,	  1998b)	  did	  not	  do	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  and	  only	  found	  20	  or	  so	  exemplary	  studies	  among	  those	  included	  in	  their	  synthesis.	  	  Kingston	  and	  Nash	  (2011)	  also	  investigated	  the	  relationship	  between	  formative	  assessment	  practices	  and	  student	  achievement,	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  median	  effect	  size	  of	  this	  relationship	  is	  closer	  to	  .20	  rather	  than	  the	  .40	  -­‐	  .70	  range	  reported	  by	  Black	  and	  Wiliam	  (1998a,	  1998b).	  	  However,	  McMillan,	  Venable,	  and	  Varier	  (2013)	  recently	  rebutted	  Kingston	  and	  Nash’s	  (2011)	  meta-­‐analysis,	  finding	  fault	  in	  the	  selection	  criteria	  and	  quality	  of	  the	  13	  studies	  that	  were	  included	  in	  their	  study.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  Dunn	  and	  Mulvenon	  (2009)	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  consensus	  about	  the	  definition	  of	  formative	  assessment	  and	  limited	  empirical	  evidence,	  yet	  were	  contradicted	  on	  both	  counts	  by	  Filsecker	  and	  Kerres	  (2012).	  	  Filsecker	  and	  Kerres	  (2012)	  provided	  a	  synopsis	  of	  11	  definitions	  of	  formative	  assessment	  and	  synthesized	  them	  into	  their	  own	  definition:	  “a	  series	  of	  informed	  and	  informing	  actions	  that	  change	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  reciprocal	  teaching-­‐learning	  relationship	  toward	  a	  more	  knowledgeable	  one”	  (p.	  4).	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Figure	  3.	  	  Types	  of	  educational	  assessments	  (Perie	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Although	  the	  promises	  of	  formative	  assessment	  are	  abundant,	  formative	  and	  interim	  assessments	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  	  Wiliam	  referred	  to	  interim	  assessment	  as	  not	  formative	  but	  “early-­‐warning	  summative”	  (2004,	  p.	  4),	  and	  Shepard	  (2005)	  clarified	  that	  the	  individual	  profile	  data	  from	  interim	  assessments	  are	  not	  directly	  formative	  because	  (a)	  the	  data	  available	  are	  at	  too	  gross	  a	  level	  of	  generality,	  and	  (b)	  feedback	  for	  improvement	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  process.	  	  Perie	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  further	  clarified	  the	  distinctions	  between	  these	  types	  of	  assessments	  (see	  Figure	  3)	  and	  helped	  to	  establish	  interim	  and	  benchmark	  as	  more	  appropriate	  labels	  for	  longer-­‐term,	  periodic	  tests.	  	  	  While	  some	  evidence	  points	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  formative	  assessment,	  studies	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  interim	  or	  benchmark	  assessment	  have	  been	  inconclusive	  (Goertz	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Henderson,	  Petrosino,	  Guckenburg,	  &	  Hamilton,	  2008;	  Shepard,	  2010).	  	  Some	  researchers	  have	  provided	  evidence	  that	  interim	  assessment	  systems	  support	  desirable	  classroom	  and	  professional	  collaboration	  effects	  when	  adequate	  instructional	  leadership	  is	  provided	  at	  the	  school	  level	  (Bulkley,	  Christman,	  Goertz,	  &	  Lawrence,	  2010;	  Bulkley,	  Olah,	  &	  Blanc	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Crane,	  2008;	  Downey,	  Steffy,	  Poston,	  &	  English,	  2009;	  Goertz	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Kerr,	  Marsh,	  Ikemoto,	  Darilek,	  &	  Barney,	  2006;	  Shepard,	  2010).	  
Summa&ve	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Purposes	  of	  interim	  assessment.	  	  Perie	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  offered	  a	  framework	  for	  considering	  how	  interim	  assessments	  might	  be	  used	  as	  part	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  assessment	  system	  and	  defined	  interim	  assessments,	  in	  part,	  on	  their	  middle-­‐range	  time-­‐scale	  location	  somewhere	  along	  a	  continuum	  between	  (a)	  once-­‐per-­‐year	  and	  (b)	  instantaneous	  and	  ongoing.	  	  Three	  main	  purposes	  for	  interim	  assessment	  were	  discussed	  in	  Perie	  et	  al.’s	  2009	  article:	  instructional,	  wherein	  the	  primary	  goal	  is	  to	  adapt	  instruction	  to	  meet	  student	  needs;	  predictive,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  assessments	  are	  designed	  to	  report	  a	  likelihood	  of	  achievement	  on	  some	  future	  summative	  test;	  and	  evaluative,	  mostly	  for	  external	  audiences	  outside	  of	  the	  school	  site	  potentially	  eliciting	  large,	  future	  changes	  system-­‐wide	  rather	  than	  a	  local	  audience	  at	  a	  single	  school.	  	  	  
Predictive	  utility	  of	  interim	  assessment.	  	  Initially,	  many	  interim	  assessment	  programs	  were	  implemented	  to	  predict	  scores	  on	  high-­‐stakes	  state	  assessments.	  	  Some	  studies	  have	  shown	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  these	  interim	  assessment	  scores	  and	  the	  corresponding	  summative	  high-­‐stakes	  assessment	  scores.	  	  Brown	  and	  Coughlin	  (2007)	  reported	  correlations	  ranging	  from	  .7	  to	  .8	  between	  TerraNova	  tests	  and	  the	  Pennsylvania	  state	  assessment;	  Williams	  (2008)	  reported	  correlations	  of	  .6	  between	  statewide	  Grade	  4	  interim	  tests	  and	  the	  Texas	  Assessment	  of	  Knowledge	  and	  Skills;	  Underwood	  (2010)	  reported	  correlations	  of	  .6	  between	  Grade	  10	  district	  interim	  assessments	  and	  the	  FCAT;	  Kingston	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  reported	  correlations	  ranging	  from	  .6	  to	  .8	  between	  the	  Kansas	  Interim	  Assessment	  System	  and	  their	  statewide	  high-­‐stakes	  test;	  and	  Chen	  (2011)	  reported	  correlations	  ranging	  from	  .6	  to	  .8	  between	  district	  interim	  assessments	  and	  FCAT	  for	  Grades	  3-­‐10	  reading,	  Grades	  3-­‐8	  math,	  Algebra,	  Grades	  5,	  8,	  and	  11	  Science.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  studies	  where	  multiple	  administrations	  of	  the	  same	  interim	  test	  are	  used	  as	  predictor	  variables	  in	  multiple	  regression	  and	  other	  similar	  correlational	  models,	  predictor	  variable	  collinearity	  is	  a	  high	  possibility	  (Chen,	  2011;	  Linn,	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2000).	  	  Collinearity	  exists	  when	  two	  predictor	  variables,	  such	  as	  interim	  benchmark	  scores,	  are	  highly	  correlated	  and	  are	  used	  together	  in	  a	  multiple	  regression;	  multicollinearity	  is	  the	  term	  used	  for	  many	  highly	  correlated	  predictors	  (Hinkle,	  Wiersma,	  &	  Jurs,	  2003).	  	  If	  not	  controlled	  or	  explained,	  collinearity	  can	  become	  an	  issue	  when	  interpreting	  results	  because	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  determine	  which	  predictor	  is	  having	  the	  effect.	  	  There	  are	  several	  methods	  for	  addressing	  collinearity,	  including	  selecting	  the	  variables	  purposefully	  to	  prevent	  redundant	  information.	  	  The	  present	  study	  utilized	  averaging	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  grade	  point	  average	  to	  control	  for	  collinearity	  among	  teacher-­‐assigned	  grades.	  	  Similarly,	  interim	  test	  scores	  were	  averaged	  by	  type	  instead	  of	  being	  included	  as	  separate	  variables	  for	  each	  individual	  interim	  test	  administration.	  



























































































































Sample&Size&by&Number&of&IBA&Tests&Taken&and&Number&of&LSA&Tests&Taken&&! ! NUM_IBA!! ! 3! 2! 1! 0! Total&
NUM_LSA!
8! 248! 419! 41! 0! 708&7! 194! 1,173! 54! 3! 1,424&6! 134! 979! 36! 1! 1,150&5! 99! 588! 27! 5! 719&4! 42! 437! 26! 5! 510&3! 31! 414! 21! 2! 468&2! 25! 133! 17! 1! 176&1! 6! 191! 13! 3! 213&0& 39& 149& 11& 234& 433&




















ANCOVA&Sample&Sizes&–&RQ3&Group! NUM_IBA! NUM_LSA! Original!n! Sample!n&1!–!High!both! High!–!3!! High!–!6,!7,!or!8! 576! 100!2!–!High!IBA,!Low!LSA! High!–!3!! Low!–!0,!1,!2,!or!3! 101! 100!3!–!Low!IBA,!High!LSA! Low!–!0!or!1! High!–!6,!7,!or!8! 135! 100!4!–!Low!both! Low!–!0!or!1! Low!–!0,!1,!2,!or!3! 302! 100!
Summary!demographic!statistics!for!the!5,348!students!who!were!included!in!the!regression!models!and!the!400!students!who!were!included!in!the!ANCOVA!model!of!the!present!study!are!shown!in!Table!4.!!
Table!4!
























































Student&Evaluation&Standards&JCSEE!Student!Evaluation!Standard! Interim!Benchmark!Assessments!(IBA)! Learning!Schedule!Assessments!(LSA)!Propriety!Standards! ! !Service!to!Studentsa! Predictive!purpose! Instructional!purpose!Appropriate!Policies!&!!!Procedures! Test!Administration!Manual;!Test!proctor!may!adjust!time!or!use!other!modifications!to!accommodate!ELL/ESE!needs!

























































	  	  	   	   	  
	  
Table	  7	  
Overview	  of	  Study	  Design	  	   	   Variables	  Research	  Question	   Model	   Dependent	   Independent	   Covariate	  
To	  what	  extent	  can	  variance	  in	  high-­‐stakes	  scores	  be	  explained	  by	  scores	  on	  interim	  assessments?	   Multiple	  Regression	  with	  5	  blocks	   FCAT_SS_2013	  
Block	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ELL,	  ESE,	  FREE_RED,	  GENDER,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  BLACK,	  HISP,	  WHITE,	  MULTI,	  AMER_IN	  
Block	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  SCHOOL_GRADE	  
Block	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  GPA	  
Block	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  FCAT_SS_2012	  
Block	  5	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  AVG_IBA,	  AVG_LSA	  	  
	  
To	  what	  extent	  can	  variance	  within	  achievement	  levels	  be	  explained	  by	  scores	  on	  interim	  assessments?	  	  
Restricted-­‐Domaina	  Multiple	  Regression	  with	  5	  blocks	   FCAT_SS_2013	  
	  
Block	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ELL,	  ESE,	  FREE_RED,	  GENDER,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  BLACK,	  HISP,	  WHITE,	  MULTI,	  AMER_IN	  
Block	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  SCHOOL_GRADE	  
Block	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  GPA	  
Block	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  FCAT_SS_2012	  
Block	  5	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  AVG_IBA,	  AVG_LSA	  
	  





































































































































































































!!!!"#"$!! = −.04 ∗ !!"" + −.12 ∗ !!"! + −.02 ∗ !!"##!!"# + −.01 ∗ !!"#$"%+ −.07 ∗ !!"#$% + −.02 ∗ !!"#$ + −.04 ∗ !!"#$% + . 01 ∗ !!"#$!!"+ . 05 ∗ !!"#$$%!!"#$% + . 05 ∗ !!"# + . 27 ∗ !!"#$!!!!!"#!+ . 22 ∗ !!"#!!"# + . 26 ∗ !!"#!!"# + !!"#"$!!!
!!!!"#"$!! = −.01 ∗ !!"" + −.08 ∗ !!"! + . 01 ∗ !!"##!!"# + −.01 ∗ !!"#$"%+ −.02 ∗ !!"#$% + −.02 ∗ !!"#! + −.02 ∗ !!"#$% + −.03 ∗ !!"#$%+ −.01 ∗ !!"#$!!" + . 02 ∗ !!"#$$%!!"#$% + . 06 ∗ !!"#+ . 14 ∗ !!"#$!!!!!"#! + . 24 ∗ !!"#!!"# + . 35 ∗ !!"#!!"# + !!"#"$!!!
!!!!"#"$!! = −.03 ∗ !!"" + −.08 ∗ !!"! + −.03 ∗ !!"##!!"# + . 02 ∗ !!"#$"%+ −.11 ∗ !!"#$% + −.05 ∗ !!"#$ + −.09 ∗ !!"#$% + −.05 ∗ !!"#$%+ . 06 ∗ !!"#$$%!!"#$% + . 07 ∗ !!"# + . 13 ∗ !!"#$!!!!!"!"+ . 29 ∗ !!"#!!"# + . 36 ∗ !!"#!!"# + !!"#"$!!!




!!!!"#"$!! = . 01 ∗ !!"" + . 06 ∗ !!"! + −.01 ∗ !!"#$"% + −.08 ∗ !!"#$%+ −.03 ∗ !!"#$ + −.05 ∗ !!"#$% + −.02 ∗ !!"#$% + . 03 ∗ !!"#$!!"+ . 30 ∗ !!"#$$%!!"#$% + . 19 ∗ !!"# + . 40 ∗ !!"#$!!!!!"#!+ . 07 ∗ !!"#!!"# + . 01 ∗ !!"#!!"# + !!"#"$!!!
Structure'coefficients.!!Again,!assuming!a!sufficient!omnibus!effect!size,!it!is!appropriate!to!investigate!the!contribution!from!individual!predictors.!!Because!beta!weights!are!contextMspecific!and!sensitive!to!collinearity,!some!researchers!have!argued!for!the!interpretation!of!structure!coefficients!in!addition!to!beta!weights!(e.g.,!Courville!&!Thompson,!2001;!Henson,!2002;!Onwuegbuzie!&!Daniel,!2001;!Thompson,!2006;!Thompson!&!Borrello,!1985).!!Conceptually,!a!structure!coefficient,!rs,!is!a!correlation!between!a!predictor!variable!and!the!predicted!values!(!)!of!the!dependent!variable.!!When!squared,!structure!coefficients!determine!how!much!variance!each!predictor!contributes!to!!.!!Structure!coefficients!can!be!calculated!by!dividing!the!correlation!between!each!predictor!variable!and!the!dependent!variable!(rX,Y!in!Table!14)!by!the!correlation!between!the!actual!and!predicted!values!of!the!dependent!variable!(R!=!.847!for!Block!5!of!the!overall!!regression!model).!!The!resulting!structure!coefficient!values!are!displayed!in!Tables!14!and!15!in!the!column!titled!rs.!!The!equation!used!to!calculate!each!structure!coefficient!was!(Courville!&!Thompson,!2001,!p.!238):!


































































Group! NUM_IBA! NUM_LSA! 2012!Grade!5!Math!FCAT!2.0!Scores! 2013!Grade!6!Math!FCAT!2.0!Scores! n!
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